The introduction of one of the most controversial electoral proposals has started a heated debate in Lebanon over how the upcoming parliamentary elections should be governed. A proposal that emerged out of a Christian gathering, the Orthodox Law proposes that each sect vote for its own representatives, attracting both support and sharp criticism. Meanwhile, the Lebanese cabinet has convened and decided to adopt an alternative version of a proportional representation law, but it is unclear at this point what it looks like and if will garner enough support to pass in Parliament.

According to the Orthodox law, Lebanon would be treated as a single voting district. Each sect would vote for its own representative, with Muslims and Christians getting equal shares of the 128-member parliament. As such, the Sunni, Shia confessions would each vote for 27 candidates; the Druze would have 8 representatives and the Alawites 2. The Maronites get the lion's share of Christian votes, with 34 seats; the Greek Orthodox would follow with 14 seats, Armenian Orthodox 5 seats and so on and so forth. The main thrust of the argument for this law is that it offers the Christian community true representation rather than have non-Christian voters in decide on their behalf.

One of the faults of this law, besides its sectarian structure, is that it defies equal suffrage by offering Christian majority sects more representation than the minorities and the Muslims. It ignores Lebanon's actual demographics and, according to Qifanabki's analysis, gives Lebanon's Greek Orthodox community twice as much weight as the Shiite vote, and Maronites one and half times more weight than Sunnis.

Some analysts and bloggers are making the case that, paradoxically, the Orthodox law may empower liberals and secularists. Qifanabki further argues that it may be the step towards a bicameral system that would free Parliament of sectarian representation and offer all of Lebanon's confessions representation. Karl reMarks and others argue that it would give secularists and the civil society a chance at representation, as they would be able to rally their supporters and pool their votes, albeit within the sectarian framework, to vote in some representatives to Parliament. It will further encourage candidates to run on the basis of political programs and inject dynamism in a rigid system.

But Tajaddod Youth pointed out to the various loopholes, highlighting that in fact it will empower the biggest sectarian parties within each sect to the detriment of the independent candidates.

The proportional representation law that was passed by the cabinet, on the other hand, divides Lebanon into 13 electoral districts. The new law, if adopted, would hypothetically allow candidates outside of the big parties to make some inroads. In effect, however, it increases the chances of Hezbollah and its allies winning over the contentious districts. The Future Movement, under the leadership of Saad Hariri, rejected this law, arguing that Hezbollah's weapons undermines this system. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt considers this law an attempt to curtail his political clout, and a few other March 14 leaders also reject it.

Many analysts argue that the various electoral guides are bargaining chips for politicians and that eventually a law similar to the 2009 electoral law (which is itself based on the 1960 law) would govern the parliamentary election. As such, Lebanon would likely be divided into 26 districts under a winner-take-all system. The alliances would determine winners in each district, especially "swing" districts where allies may need cross-confessional votes to make it. This is why the approval of kingmakers such as Walid Jumblatt is key in shaping its outcome, and the outcome of the ensuing presidential election and new cabinet. With the ongoing Syrian conflict next door, the stakes are higher than ever, and every seat counts.