Evidence is mounting that Northern Lebanon is becoming a microcosm of the Syrian war.  Already, Tripoli is home to hallmarks of the Syrian conflict: snipers, rockets, and mortar fire. As the fight for Damascus intensifies, Tripoli has become the bellwether for what to expect in Lebanon.  Whether Lebanon slides into the sectarian chaos of its neighbor depends largely on the integrity of the Lebanese state, the effectiveness of its domestic intelligence, and how competently it can mobilize the army to deter the spread of domestic clashes once they erupt.

Given the toxic cocktail of volatile elements, it's no surprise that violence in Tripoli has flared as the security situation in Syria has depreciated.  Last week Tripoli saw the largest outbreak of violence to date, with clashes between pro and anti-Assad elements claiming at least 17 lives. The fighting, financed and armed by both Hezbollah and its Salafist rivals, was sparked by the killing of 14 Lebanese Salafists in an ambush by Syrian regime forces in Tall Kalakh. The regime has returned three corpses and kept the rest, agitating families who are left waiting for their relatives. Former PM Saad Hariri had accused Bashar Assad of taking advantage of the situation to prolong the conflict, to which Assad fired back by issuing arrest warrants against Hariri and MP Okab Sakr for allegedly arming Syrian rebels.

The United States has already acted to bolster the sovereignty of the Lebanese government and its armed forces.  This week, six US military helicopters arrived in Lebanon along with a 42-meter coastal security craft to patrol Lebanese waters.  This was the first exchange of military hardware since the official resumption of bilateral US military aid to Lebanon earlier this fall.  It is a modest but symbolic indication of support for the embattled Lebanese government as it struggles to maintain stability amidst the rapid deterioration of regional security.  The helicopters, however, will only go so far in shoring up Lebanese security. Thus far, there is little indication that the country is poised to become embroiled in an interstate conflict.  Rather, developments in Tripoli suggest that should the Syrian conflict genuinely spread to Lebanon, it will do so incrementally as a rising tide of sectarian war.

Stunting the rise of that tide is a job for Lebanon's internal security service, a division which has been slow to right itself after it suffered a crippling setback with the loss of its director, General Wissam al-Hassan, in October.  Before his assassination, Al-Hassan was the most effective gatekeeper in charge of insulating Lebanon's domestic stability from foreign meddling.  This summer he rolled-up a Syrian sleeper cell bent on sowing mass terror across Lebanon under the direction of former MP, Michel Samaha.  Though Samaha was thwarted (and is now expected to be further interrogated about his plot), it is clear that the General al-Hassan left large shoes to fill.  Whether Lebanon can maintain domestic stability depends on whether its internal intelligence will be able to stem the flow of weapons and fighters of all sectarian armed groups and in both directions across the border with Syria.

Furthermore, what's needed for the ability of both security apparatuses to operate is political cover by the respective authorities, as well as an act of leadership by its politicians. PM Najib Mikati hails from one of Tripoli's most influential families but he has fell short of addressing the security situation in his own hometown. President Michel Suleiman stepped in to oversee the deployment of troops - a positive, albeit tardy - move towards enforcing authority.

Another growing concern in Tripoli is the rise of Sunni extremism. A phenomenon that arose in light of Hezbollah's dominance, as well as the absence of a true Sunni leader, among other things, the extremists are now gaining traction within their community as uncertainty pervades the country. More sectarian fighting is bound to embolden extremist voices in both camps.

While Tripoli is the most glaring example of how the above trends could cripple Lebanon, the heart of the problem rests in Beirut.  Right now, the challenge of empowering the state and deescalating the paths to violence should begin with resolving the political impasse which began after al-Hassan's assassination. The deployment of the army and the US Administration's support for Lebanon are positive steps towards containing violence. Lebanese leaders must also address economic and social challenges those communities are facing, as they tend to fuel conflict. Despite these measures, however, it takes an effective government with a political will to put an end to the fighting. Without it, Lebanon simply cannot be expected to weather the storm growing on its Eastern border.