Lebanon will assume the presidency of the UN Security Council (UNSC) at the end of August, for a period lasting one month. This will prove to be an intricate phase as critical resolutions on Syria may be hotly debated. Currently, Lebanon continues to hedge its bets on the Syrian regime's survival, preferring middle ground solutions and refusing to "interfere" in another state's domestic affairs. However, this rationale seems to have been applied only to some cases, but not all.

As a nonpermanent SC member for 2011, Lebanon had a definitive stance on the Libyan regime, leading UNSC efforts against Muammar Qaddafi's regime and denouncing violence against Libyan civilians. When it came to Syria, however, Lebanon did not act with the same vigor. Explanations of its behavior abound and often conflict.

Technically speaking, the decision at the UNSC is controlled by the Foreign Ministry, which is dominated by pro-Syrian loyalists. Lebanese Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour made it clear to Syrian President Bashar Assad at a  meeting in Damascus last weekend that Lebanon "rejects attempts of foreign interference in Syria's internal affairs."

At the helm of the current cabinet is Prime Minister Najib Mikati, a self-proclaimed moderate politician, a personal friend of Syria's Assad, and an aspiring Sunni leader. Wearing these different hats has not been easy. Mikati maintains a conciliatory attitude towards Syria but tries not to appear entirely dismissive of the Sunni community's desires. Given sectarian considerations in Lebanon, Mikati can only go so far in opposing former PM Saad Hariri without antagonizing his support base, which still voices support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and is highly sympathetic with the Syrian people.

As such, Mikati has asserted Lebanon's commitment to the international community, the STL and the peacekeeping forces in the South. When it comes to the UNSC, however, he believes Lebanon is "unique" and should abstain from interfering in Syria's affairs. Many take his side, arguing that Lebanon is too weak to unilaterally oppose Syria's will. Others add that Lebanon does not act individually at the UNSC but is rather a representative of the Arab world; hence, any stance it takes on Syria must conform with that of the Arab League (granted the Arab League has none).

The opposing March 14 coalition, emboldened by a realization that the Syrian regime may not survive this battle and appalled by the unrelenting crackdown on civilians, has publicly criticized Assad's regime. The group slammed what it referred to as a "shameful" decision last week to detach Lebanon from the UNSC presidential statement condemning violence in Syria, saying that the government's position "is its own."

Lebanon is indeed in a delicate position. Its stability and the safety of many of its leaders and thinkers are at the mercy of the neighboring Syrian regime. Historically, whenever Lebanese journalists, politicians and intellectuals spoke up against Syrian hegemony, they faced threats; many were killed. Further complicating Lebanon's stance is the anticipation that any UNSC resolution may be obstructed by Syria's allies, China and Russia. September may prove to be a tough month for Lebanese diplomacy as it battles with a decision that is as critical for Syria as it is for Lebanon.