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**REBELS WITHOUT A CAUSE?
NORTH KOREA'S AND IRAN'S CHALLENGES TO THE NPT**

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Introduction

This paper assesses the challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) currently posed by unchecked nuclear weapons development in North Korea and the incipient nuclear weapons program in Iran, and considers what actions the transatlantic partners might take to constructively meet these challenges.

These two challenges, distinct in some ways and similar in others, converge on a common element: the role played by broader security environments, regionally and globally. These environments condition and in some ways drive North Korea's and Iran's specific national nuclear ambitions, which in turn, through these environments, aggravate and magnify other proliferation challenges. Hence, the North Korean and Iranian cases are pivotal pressure points shaping nonproliferation and disarmament efforts generally.

These two critical cases illustrate how the end of the Cold War has inaugurated a second nuclear era that has significantly (but not fundamentally) reshaped the role of nuclear weapons in global politics, and hence also the pursuit of nonproliferation and disarmament. Abated Cold War nuclear dangers initially brought encouraging progress toward wider nuclear disarmament goals. But emerging new dangers helped stall this progress, in part because Cold War era arms control

and nonproliferation practices, focused more on capabilities than broader political contexts, were not tailored to meet the increased role of encompassing security tensions in fueling newer nuclear proliferation challenges. Today, the tenacious retention of nuclear weapons by those states that have them and the fervent desire for acquisition by many parties that lack them are most directly driven by specific political circumstances, not abstract strategic logic.

Stemming nuclear proliferation and developing real progress toward the disarmament goals enshrined in the NPT thus requires careful attention not only to how nuclear dangers have changed in the new nuclear era, but also to the political environments those dangers populate. Successfully meeting the North Korean and Iranian challenges addressed in this paper will require progressive political remedies as well as rigorous technical mechanisms.

North Korea

North Korea's nuclear aspirations have been problematic since it first joined the NPT in 1985. From 1994 the Agreed Framework successfully froze North Korea's plutonium-based nuclear program, but never succeeded as intended in resolving discrepancies of past North Korean activities or removing known spent fuel from the country. These shortcomings loomed when, in October 2002, charges that North Korea was undertaking a second, uranium-based nuclear program triggered an iterated crumbling of the Agreed Framework culminating in North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.¹

The collapse of the Agreed Framework created a critical watershed, shifting the status quo fundamentally. Since 2003 there have existed no direct restraints on North Korea's plutonium-based program. Moreover, by withdrawing from the Agreed Framework and the NPT without suffering meaningful sanction (in part due to lack of viable options), North Korea successfully stepped past several implicit "lines in the sand" which cannot now credibly be redrawn.

In February 2005, just months before the 2005 NPT Review Conference, North Korea for the first time stated explicitly that it possessed nuclear weapons.² In April 2005 North Korea shut down the research reactor at Yongbyong—which it restarted when the Agreed Framework collapsed at the end of 2002—suggesting that it is preparing to collect a new supply of spent fuel to reprocess into additional weapons-grade plutonium.³ Surveillance has detected North Korean preparations for a nuclear test, which North Korean officials have hinted may be coming soon.⁴ prospects of resumption of the "six-party talks" are dimming, and the United States and its regional allies are

now actively considering new options, including potential UN Security Council action.⁵ Recent controversy over the statement by the head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency that North Korea had developed nuclear warheads small, light and rigorous enough to ride a ballistic missile to a target illustrates the dynamism and uncertainties of the current situation.⁶

As the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis deepens, it is worth parsing the potential repercussions. Broadly, there are three areas of consequence of North Korea's nuclear weapons development for the nonproliferation regime: deleterious regional responses, the corrosive impact on the NPT itself, and proliferation of nuclear materials and expertise.

First, a steadily (if slowly) growing arsenal of nuclear weapons in North Korea will aggravate tensions and uncertainties in East Asia, in some cases potentially past breaking points. An immediate concern is that North Korea's ambitions would spur Japan to obtain nuclear weapons of its own.⁷ A North Korean nuclear test would dramatically emphasize the specific threat to Japan many in Japan increasingly perceive North Korea to pose, and would certainly fuel incipient Japanese opinion favoring an independent nuclear capability. This might spur similar initiatives in South Korea and Taiwan.⁸

In fact, a Japanese decision to go nuclear would be harder than some imagine and would not follow reflexively from North Korean behavior.⁹ Nevertheless, if North Korea's actions trigger a nuclear proliferation "domino effect" in East Asia, the viability of the nonproliferation regime would be shaken at its foundation. Yet there are indications that the Bush administration is prepared to accept a nuclear North Korea as a *fait accompli*, and might even look more benignly than its predecessors on Japan becoming a nuclear-armed state as a consequence.¹⁰

Second, North Korea is the first state ever to withdraw from the NPT. Although within its legal rights in doing so, many dispute that this action absolves North Korea from responsibility for previous NPT noncompliance.¹¹ Nevertheless, the UN Security Council has not acted on the 2003 referral by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (due largely to Chinese resistance), and the 2004 NPT Preparatory Conference "sidestepped" the issue in order not to interfere with the "six-party talks" process.¹² Ultimately, whether or not North Korea will be pressed on its pre-withdrawal NPT noncompliance through formal mechanisms such as the UN Security Council will be a political rather than a legal determination. But diverse political outcomes – such as a negotiated settlement absolving some past noncompliance in exchange for a

non-nuclear outcome, or failure to reach a negotiated settlement despite holding off on sanctions toward that end – could forge precedents corrosive to the treaty regime.

The Bush Administration rarely expresses worries over the impact of North Korea's NPT withdrawal on the viability of the treaty. This is perhaps unsurprising, given its lack of faith in both nonproliferation and international treaties generally, and the dissonance between its own nuclear policies and the US commitment to complete nuclear disarmament under the NPT's Article VI.

Third, North Korea's reinvigorated nuclear program gives it the potential to export fissile materials, nuclear weapons development technologies and expertise, or even completed operational weapons. This potential is highlighted by the depth of North Korean involvement in the nuclear network of Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan and the recent questions as to whether uranium discovered in Libya might have originated in North Korea.¹³ Given growing concerns over nuclear terrorism, this dimension of the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear capacities may be the greatest; it is clearly the consequence the Bush administration takes most seriously, and may now be the administration's principal "red line."¹⁴

This broad array of consequences demonstrates the stakes at hand if North Korea develops a sizable, tested nuclear arsenal. But achieving a non-nuclear Korean peninsula peacefully no longer requires merely stopping North Korea's nuclear program; it now requires rolling back that program. Many prior strategies to curtail North Korea's nuclear weapons development are not up to this qualitatively more difficult task.¹⁵

What the transatlantic partners can do

The goal of rolling back North Korea's nuclear weapons acquisition should not be surrendered. Given the daunting obstacles, however, the international community should also be preparing for its failure by taking measures to prevent this development from fueling nuclear proliferation elsewhere as much as possible. Both these goals point to building better cooperation among key interested parties and enhancing mechanisms of regional security cooperation and global nonproliferation compliance.

Much analysis of policy aimed at curtailing North Korea's nuclear ambitions remains framed by the familiar question: is North Korea prepared to reach an agreement to surrender its nuclear

capability? Engagement promoters tend to answer “yes,” confrontation advocates usually answer “no.” Current US policy debate remains fixed to this one-dimensional framing of policy choice, with Bush Administration policy-makers arrayed (with some internal tensions) on the confrontational side of the spectrum.

But whether or not North Korea is inclined to deal is the wrong question. Given the opacity of the regime, the answer is essentially unknowable. Both camps base their expectations of Pyongyang’s behavior more on conjecture than evidence. Also, as often happens with governments facing complex decisions, North Korea’s leadership may not have made up its mind; its thinking is no doubt evolving as its nuclear program develops. Kim Jong Il himself may not now know exactly what agreement terms he would accept, and may not come to decide unless and until, like Reagan at Reykjavik, the choice is at hand.

Effective policy will be independent of specific assumptions concerning the nature and disposition of the ruling regime in Pyongyang. With North Korea’s program now freed from the bounds of the Agreed Framework, it is now more important than ever to transcend the stale antinomy of “engagement” versus “confrontation.”

Most reasoned proposals for dealing with North Korea call for some combination of “carrots” and “sticks.” But there is a further need to specify the tactical aims of any “combined” approach. Policy should not be based on an expectation that North Korea’s regime will respond in a predictable tit-for-tat manner to either incentives or constraints. Instead, policy should be premised on shaping the international environmental conditions within which North Korea must promulgate its actions. Shaping the constraints on North Korea’s choices will help narrow the range of possible outcomes regardless of Pyongyang’s “disposition of the day.”

Although the US position is central, the European Union through transatlantic partnership can play a positive role. EU partners can seek actively to help break up the log jam in US debate. Working together, the transatlantic community can generate more effective action to address all the consequences of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and spearhead the complete unity in the global community that a rollback of North Korea’s nuclear program will require.

Past European involvement with North Korean conundrums has been tangible but limited. The EU has been a significant humanitarian aid donor to North Korea since the mid-1990s, and has also promoted energy development. Some EU states maintain diplomatic relations with North

Korea, but objections of other states (in part on human rights grounds) have blocked direct EU-North Korea bilateral agreements. The EU joined the Executive Board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which oversaw the construction of two new light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea and other Agreed Framework energy provisions. However, the EU's financial contribution to KEDO was modest and hopes in some corners that the EU could help mediate in the nuclear crisis did not emerge. Subsequently, the EU played only a minor role in KEDO and virtually no role outside KEDO in Korean peninsula security interactions.¹⁶

EU policy toward North Korea became most assertive at the high point of intra-Korean rapprochement under Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy." But with the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in 2003 and suspension of KEDO activities, the EU has essentially followed the US lead in blaming North Korea for these developments, while still stressing continued EU support for ongoing South Korean engagement.¹⁷ European partners could productively expand on this balanced but passive stance through several means.

A direct EU role in US-North Korean political engagement over nuclear issues or in the now-moribund "six-party talks" process would be neither useful nor welcomed. But European countries – through the EU or independently – can contribute positively by supporting better cohesion among the other directly interested countries represented in the six-party talks, and especially between the United States and China.

Apart from technological obstacles, the only serious constraint on North Korea's nuclear ambitions now is diplomatic pressure from China. The United States and China share an interest in preventing emergence of a full-fledged nuclear-armed North Korea, and Beijing holds several powerful coercive instruments, if it chooses to wield them. However, there are limits to North Korea's sensitivity to Chinese coercion. There are limits as well China's willingness to utilize these tools on behalf of the US priority to deny North Korea a nuclear explosive, when Beijing's own priority probably is to prevent the country itself from exploding. China's preference for a negotiated solution coupled with gradual internal reform, rather than "regime change," stems not from unwillingness to confront North Korea's nuclear ambitions but from its understanding of the problems those ambitions pose specifically for China.

The fundamentally shifted status quo in the wake of the Agreed Framework's breakdown puts time on North Korea's side. Pyongyang can exploit divergence of US and Chinese goals in

Korea to obstruct political processes that might eventually compel the regime to compromise its nuclear ambitions. To help blunt this tactic, the European states can work actively to promote concord among the United States, China and the other six-party talk partners in their stance toward North Korea. Such a stance would entail US acceptance of the impracticality of “regime change” and Chinese acceptance of an active role for the UN Security Council.

Secondly, the transatlantic partners can help bolster protections against North Korea exporting nuclear materials & technologies. In particular, they can enhance the effectiveness of the US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by seeking to link it more directly to established NPT compliance mechanisms. The legitimacy of the PSI has grown as it has gained more national adherents and the endorsement of the G-8 Global Partnership and the UN Secretary General.¹⁸ But the PSI and similar initiatives remain ad hoc national groupings disassociated from multilateral nonproliferation treaty regimes.¹⁹ More direct linkages to NPT compliance mechanisms could enhance the accountability and effectiveness of those initiatives, whose responsiveness and flexibility in turn could help prioritize achievement over process in the NPT regime.

Such synergistic linkages are essential to containing North Korea’s nuclear materials. The PSI can effectively thwart some large and observable shipments of proliferation-relevant technologies, but cannot prevent with certainty North Korea from smuggling small containers of fissile materials into the global black market, particularly because it does nothing to close North Korea’s land border with China. Embedding ad hoc initiatives like the PSI in established multilateral compliance mechanisms would facilitate greater cooperation from China on this problem. Developing these synergies would also strengthen the world’s available proliferation containment tools more broadly and enhance the nonproliferation regime’s role as the locus for international compliance enforcement.

Finally, European states can also work to promote emergence of a viable East Asian regional security framework as a bulwark against the disruptive effects of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. This challenge has already spurred greater collaboration on nonproliferation in the region, represented by the “six-party talks” process. This progress can continue regardless of whether that process is ultimately successful, and can help prevent other regional nuclear dominos from falling if it is not.

Particularly valuable could be the capacity of European partners to offer models for regional security collaboration distinct from the Anglo-American approach: less oriented around structural power relationships, and more hearkening to the European tradition of building international society.²⁰ The EU's own 1994 "New Asia Strategy", calling for a "non-confrontational partnership of equals" across a wide range of issues, might serve such a role. Such models could help bridge certain Anglo-American and Asian predilections, or at least promote innovation by diversifying the range of potential models to draw from.

All these efforts would be salutary for global nonproliferation efforts. Forging a common global posture relieving Chinese resistance to UN Security Council consideration of North Korea's NPT noncompliance would mitigate the corrosive precedents that current inaction is setting for other non-nuclear NPT parties, independently of the ultimate outcome in Korea. In the event a non-nuclear North Korea is not achieved, regional collaboration restraining the domino effect of North Korea's nuclear acquisition elsewhere in East Asia and containing North Korean temptations to export their materials and capabilities would be crucial to preserving the NPT itself, especially if these efforts were linked more tangibly to the global nonproliferation regime.²¹

Iran

While some sources of Iran's nuclear ambitions are comparable to North Korea's, the statuses and implications of the programs differ in certain ways, both technically and politically. Iran's nuclear program is less advanced. Iran is not currently suspected of possessing nuclear weapons or even weapons-grade fissile materials, but recent discoveries indicate that Iran's fissile materials processing capabilities – its uranium enrichment program in particular – are more advanced than previously known. The pilot plant at Iran's uranium centrifuge enrichment facility at Natanz, at which Iran initiated testing in 2003, could when completed produce between 10-12 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. A planned larger plant would produce approximately 400-500 kilograms annually, or enough for 15-20 nuclear weapons a year. Left unchecked, Iran could be producing enough highly enriched uranium in these facilities to make a nuclear weapon by 2007 to 2010.²²

The world community first learned of the Natanz facility in August 2002. The IAEA first visited the site in February 2003, and by September was challenging Iran to demonstrate it was not undertaking nuclear weapons development. Iran and European Union representatives reached agreement on October 21 for Iran to abide by the IAEA Additional Protocol and voluntarily

suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.²³ Subsequent concerns over Iranian cooperation with the IAEA culminated in a second EU-Iran agreement on November 14, 2004, reaffirming the previous agreement and recommitting Iran to voluntary suspension of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities.²⁴ But by May 2005 Iran was once again evidently restive with its voluntary suspension in the context of ongoing diplomatic engagement with the EU. The reported enrichment activity does not violate Iran's NPT commitments or IAEA safeguard obligations, but its earlier concealment of the facilities did. The IAEA has accounted for all known nuclear materials, but is not yet satisfied that Iran does not possess undeclared nuclear materials or with Iran's explanations for detected evidence of highly-enriched uranium in the facilities.²⁵

Unlike North Korea, which long maintained its need for a "powerful deterrent" before recently claiming explicitly to be nuclear-armed, Iran's leadership assiduously maintains its commitment to developing only peaceful nuclear technologies and to its NPT obligations, reaffirmed in the November 2004 EU-Iran agreement. But technical assessments that Iran's technologies and activities are not required for a peaceful nuclear energy program combined with discoveries of trace elements of highly enriched uranium leave these claims suspect.

While Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is still a distant prospect, its potential consequences in some ways mirror those emerging from North Korea's acquisition, and in a few ways may exceed them in gravity.

First, a nuclear Iran would certainly aggravate tensions and uncertainties across the strategically critical Middle East. Iran has successfully tested ballistic missiles with a 1300km range, sufficient to reach Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and parts of Turkey,²⁶ and might have the technological wherewithal – which North Korea may not – to fashion nuclear explosives small and light enough to be missile warheads. Israel and Pakistan already possess nuclear weapons; Iran's acquisition could spur nuclear arms racing in both directions. States such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, though lacking the near-nuclear capabilities of Japan, would likely perceive increased pressures and would at least seek additional security reassurances from the United States if not nuclear capabilities of their own. Political divides between Iran and its neighbors on ethnic and religious lines would likely deepen, tensions surrounding Israel's regional role would increase and an eroding security climate in the Middle East would impinge global oil economics. As the region's relationships are more complex, volatile and fragile than those in East Asia, the longer term regional implications are more unpredictable.

Second, unlike North Korea, which was never in full compliance with NPT obligations, Iran developed its indigenous nuclear technologies while within the NPT community (Iran acceded to the NPT in 1970, fifteen years sooner). Hence, Iran's open acquisition of nuclear weapons and withdrawal from the NPT would not set a precedent but would challenge the NPT's verification and compliance provisions more deeply. As with North Korea, if Iran's nuclear weapons development progressed far enough to require an extraordinary negotiated settlement to roll it back, this would also impinge the credibility of the regime as a whole.

Third, Iran would have the potential, like North Korea, to export fissile materials, nuclear weapons development technologies and expertise, or even completed operational weapons. Iran is suspected of having links to the nuclear network of Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan and, while not reliant like North Korea on military exports for financial gain, has a more notorious record than North Korea for supporting international terrorism. Iranian leaders have openly alluded to the prospect that nuclear weapons could inflict great costs on the United States and Israel through a variety of means.²⁷

North Korea's case demonstrates that as a country's nuclear weapons program approaches fruition, its capacity to begin wielding nuclear threats can erode the attractiveness of a negotiated settlement while also neutralizing others' coercive threats intending to induce accommodation. That Iran's program is not as advanced, and is not yet even quite self-sufficient, offers greater opportunity for curtailing it now.²⁸ As Iran's program progresses, these chances will wane; the lessons from North Korea underscore the urgency of pursuing these chances with Iran now.

What the transatlantic partners can do

The self-sufficient and advanced state of North Korea's nuclear program combined with the inscrutability of the regime leave only a strategy of battling uphill to roll back Pyongyang's nuclear achievements and, failing that, to mitigate their impact. Prospects in Iran's case are better on both counts. The incipient state of its nuclear program requires little rollback of existing capabilities and provides chances for countervailing tradeoffs, while Iran's relative openness offers opportunities to directly mute its nuclear ambitions. The transatlantic community thus can work toward effective solutions on both the supply and demand sides of the problem.

Supply

Iran's nuclear activities have spotlighted a "loophole" in the NPT. Nuclear fuel processing capabilities, guaranteed under Article IV for peaceful uses, can also be utilized to generate weapons-grade fissile materials; once these capacities and knowledge are in hand, a state could "break out" of the NPT and become nuclear-armed relatively rapidly. Hence, Iran's activities have generated growing support for increased restrictions on the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities of non-nuclear NPT parties. Many NPT experts are now calling to "internationalize" the nuclear fuel cycle by placing the IAEA in charge of providing uninterrupted supplies of low enriched uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel at market rates to all non-nuclear NPT parties so long as those parties maintained all applicable safeguards and inspection procedures.²⁹

Iran adamantly resists this proposal, insisting that curtailing NPT-permitted development of enrichment and reprocessing technologies would create "a second discrimination, one between those that have peaceful nuclear technology and those not allowed to have peaceful nuclear technology."³⁰ This claim is technically accurate: Iran would be restricted from possessing nuclear-fuel cycle capabilities that exist in a number of other non-nuclear NPT states, notably Japan. But Iran's claims that imposing this constraint would undermine NPT Article IV assurances for peaceful civilian use may be doubted, as other states are similarly restricted.³¹

Iran's past deceptions concerning its nuclear practices, in contrast to Japan's record, "explain international confidence in Japan's nuclear responsibility – and doubts about Iran's."³² The United States invokes this type of distinction in proposing to deny support for civilian nuclear programs promised under Article IV to countries deemed in violation of their nonproliferation commitments under Articles I & II.³³ This approach tightens the linkage of verification and compliance, and focuses on states of most proliferation concern. But this form of discrimination would also require case-by-case action, creating a politically-charged and potentially inconsistent implementation process.

A more sweeping but less political approach would prohibit new nuclear fuel cycle capabilities to any country, not only those suspected of nuclear weapons ambitions. This position holds that internationalization of the fuel cycle is necessary simply to stop the spread of the capacity to generate weapons-grade fissile materials to more countries – even more Japans are not desirable.³⁴ "Terrorism and unstable global security dynamics make it too risky to allow new factories for separating plutonium and enriching uranium."³⁵

Yet internationalization of the fuel cycle under these stronger terms would likely not entail non-nuclear states currently possessing full fuel cycle capabilities (such as Japan) to give them up.³⁶ Closing the fuel cycle “loophole” in a manner “grandfathering” existing fuel cycle capacities would put in place a second discrimination analogous to the NPT’s original allowance of the existing five nuclear-armed states to retain those weapons. Devising such a scheme would require artful consensus building involving compromises to non-nuclear states without indigenous facilities (such as subsidies for plant construction and fuel-cycle services) and an implementation considered fair and equitable by all.³⁷ But consensus support across the non-nuclear NPT community for new universally-applied (if discriminatory) restrictions would obviate claims that Article IV was being undermined, and might facilitate Iranian acceptance as well.

Demand

Restricting access to nuclear resources cannot be a permanent nonproliferation solution for a state determined to sustain a nuclear option. It can stall nuclear ambitions but institutionalizes a tension always vulnerable to breakdown. A permanent solution must neutralize a state’s nuclear ambitions at the root by relieving the needs and opportunities for nuclear coercion emanating from the state’s strategic environment. In contrast to North Korea’s case, Iran’s relative domestic openness and existing engagement with the international community offer considerably wider possibilities to address the underlying circumstances driving Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Iran, while far from a free country, has a history of constitutionalism and pluralist politics, a functioning, globally-engaged civil society, and established (though highly constrained) political competition.³⁸ Harder-line elements have reasserted greater control over Iran in recent years, and decision-making on nuclear weapons is especially secretive and tightly controlled (in part because Iran publicly denies seeking nuclear weapons).³⁹ Nevertheless the regime is not monolithic and Iran’s internal political evolution has created myriad linkages to the international community both politically and economically. While speculations as to the machinations of Kim Jong-il’s regime are a poor basis for policy, knowledge of Iranian domestic forces is an attainable and vital resource for policy development.

In addition to its greater openness, Iran’s valuation of engagement with the global community is also evident, providing a wider range of incentives to enter into and abide by agreements and a wider range of potential costs (especially including costs below the level of explicit sanctions or military action) to dissuade breaching agreements. Iran is decidedly more sensitive to the benefits of global political integration, and the costs of political isolation, than is North Korea.⁴⁰

These factors enhance prospects for success of a negotiated settlement, specifically by offering opportunities to address Iran's motivations for obtaining nuclear weapons. These ambitions fall roughly into two categories.

The first category pertains to specific regional security threats: the nuclear capabilities of Israel and Pakistan, and the presence of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether or not a nuclear capability would be of strategic value to Iran vis-à-vis Israel and Pakistan is arguable. There is a case to be made that a small nuclear arsenal would not be an effective deterrent, and that Iran's nuclear ambitions create incentives for US or Israeli coercion rather than deterring them.⁴¹ At the same time, Iran may calculate that the United States and Israel are hostile to Iran's regime in any event, but would be very sensitive to even a minimal Iranian nuclear threat in contemplating any actions against the regime. Tangibly alleviating these concerns through a broader regional security settlement would deflate Iranian nuclear ambitions.

The second category of Iran's interest in nuclear weapons is the more amorphous function they would serve to rally Iranian nationalism and symbolize Iran's position as an important power in the region and the world. A nuclear capability would equalize Iran with Pakistan (a country many Iranians view as inferior in broader terms) and provide invaluable symbolic leverage vis-à-vis the United States well beyond specific strategic considerations.

Crucially, neither set of ambitions is confined to hardline clerical factions.⁴² Hence, strategies aimed only at bolstering moderate forces within Iran are unlikely to relieve domestic interest in a nuclear capability. The opposite is closer to the case: strategies to relieve Iran's strategic tensions and avoid instigating Iranian nationalism would not only deflate Iranians' perceived need for nuclear weapons but also promote domestic conditions encouraging more moderate elements. Conversely, coercive actions would likely produce opposite results.⁴³

Thus, both the tangible and intangible sources of Iran's nuclear ambitions can be most readily addressed by better integrating Iran regionally and globally in broader political, economic and social terms. This goal cannot be achieved quickly and will require important quid pro quos from Iran, including an end to support of terrorist organizations and recognition of Israel. Whether to pursue such ends through step-by-step engagement or a comprehensive "grand bargain" requires careful attention.⁴⁴

Common Stance

The European Union has the best opportunity of any actor to gain Iranian accommodation. Iran's desire to engage Europe flows from a range of longstanding political and economic linkages and is unburdened by the historical animosities that make US-Iran engagement so problematic.⁴⁵

Although the principal European states differ somewhat in their viewpoints toward Iran, the E3 have been able to act with single purpose and have achieved significant if temporary restraints in Iran's development of its nuclear program since 2003.

Yet no permanent solution is possible without US engagement. As with North Korea, the Bush Administration has had difficulty achieving internal consensus on a policy toward Iran, particularly following September 11, 2001.⁴⁶ Also similarly, the current US posture is at odds with those of the other key interested states, in this case UE representatives Germany, France and the UK (the "E3"), who remain frustrated by US refusal to join their engagement process.

Just as effective pressure on North Korea requires a consensus on purpose between the United States and China, effective pressure on Iran requires similar concord between the United States and its European partners. The principal European states must be proactive in engaging the United States to develop such a common stance.

Regarding Iran's nuclear program specifically, a common transatlantic stance would minimally require Iran's full implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol and full accounting for all past activities in line with its IAEA safeguards agreements. If Iran is to verifiably forswear all nuclear fuel cycle technologies that could support a nuclear weapons capability, the transatlantic partners will need to forge a broad international agreement to internationalize the fuel cycle to induce Iranian agreement. In particular, a scheme that does not discriminate among states on a case-by-case basis would be more likely to overcome nuclear ambitions driven by Iranian nationalism and desires for equity. To gain Iran's acquiescence, the international community would need to guarantee Iran's access to technologies and fuel supplies for a peaceful nuclear power program, and should consider allowing development of the Bushehr nuclear power facilities with spent fuel returned to Russia, rather than pressuring Russia to abandon its involvement in that project – which would also help secure Russia's support of the transatlantic position.⁴⁷

A common transatlantic stance would also delineate the broader benefits Iran would accrue from the global community for meeting these expectations, and the consequences Iran would suffer for failing to do so. Achieving such a stance will require flexibility on both sides of the Atlantic. For its part, the United States should be willing to engage Iran directly on a wider array of regional security concerns. As part of a process aimed at normalizing relations, the United States should be prepared to acknowledge the threatening nature of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and of Israel's nuclear capabilities, and to offer security assurances in exchange for nonproliferation. The United States should also push more actively and creatively for a general Middle East peace arrangement achieving final settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict, with concomitant expectations of an end to Iran's support for regional extremist groups. And the United States should forswear the "axis of evil" rhetoric and "regime change" threats that merely fuel Iranian nationalism. In sum, the United States should incorporate knowledge of Iran's internal dynamics to forge a policy strategy anticipating possible courses of Iran's future evolution, rather than just reacting to the tensions of the past and present.⁴⁸

European policymakers can facilitate this process by articulating precise expectations for US policy and by underwriting a demonstrable transatlantic commitment to equitable peace arrangements – neither US security assurances nor Iranian belief in those assurances will be forthcoming in the absence of a regional security framework supporting those assurances.⁴⁹ But the European partners will also have to be equally willing to join the United States in imposing costs if Iran fails to meet its expectations.⁵⁰ A common transatlantic stance would make economic sanctions and UN Security Council action credible consequences of Iranian recalcitrance.

Some measures will require a unity of purpose beyond the transatlantic partners. Denying Iran access to nuclear fuel cycle technologies now allowed to other NPT non-nuclear states will require a consensus on refining application of NPT Article IV that spans the NPT community. Curtailing external support for suspect Iranian nuclear technology development will require Russian cooperation. No broader regional settlement is possible without redressing the Israel-Palestine conflict, which will require accommodation from Israel itself. A credible prospect of economic sanctions will require strong commitment before the fact by key states whose economic interests would be impinged, particularly Asian powers dependent on Iranian oil imports.⁵¹ Such unity in the international community in turn will require not just a harmonic transatlantic stance, but a stance visibly fair and focused on nonproliferation goals.

Conclusion: Minding the Elephant

The nuclear weapons and global security policies of the Bush Administration are today the “elephant in the room” of the global nonproliferation regime. Peacefully coping with the proliferation challenges of North Korea and Iran will require the United States to lead the NPT’s P5 in taking seriously their Article VI commitments to nuclear disarmament.

New US nuclear weapons initiatives are reinforcing US reliance on nuclear coercion in its security posture and eroding the global norm of nuclear non-use. The Bush Administration’s new nuclear weapons design plans and counterproliferation strategies deepen reliance on nuclear deterrence and dangerously expand efforts at nuclear compellence.⁵² “Adaptive planning” that treats conventional and nuclear capabilities interchangeably erodes the nuclear “firebreak” long seen as a key psychological impediment to nuclear weapons use.

This expansive application of US nuclear weapons capabilities for deterrence and pre-emptive strike roles is fundamentally inimical to nuclear arms control.⁵³ But the Bush Administration has shown little interest in arms control, nuclear or otherwise, and is particularly pessimistic over the prospects for multilateral nonproliferation efforts: the conclusion of the single paragraph on the role of “active nonproliferation diplomacy” in the Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction simply states the need for “a full range of operational capabilities” if the efforts fail.⁵⁴ In this view, the problem of proliferation is not nuclear weapons *per se*, but nuclear weapons in the wrong hands. This problem cannot be solved through engagements and bargains that leave troublesome governments intact; the only permanent solution to nuclear proliferation is “regime change.” US nuclear capabilities are not part of this problem; they are part of its solution.⁵⁵ Thus, Bush Administration officials consistently maintain that US nuclear weapons policies are consistent with US NPT obligations and not relevant to the nuclear ambitions of states such as North Korea and Iran. Recently and representatively, Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker, head of the US delegation to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, stated on the eve of the conference that the US disarmament record is “excellent” and that US plans to use the conference to focus attention on North Korea and Iran were fully appropriate. “This notion that the United States needs to make concessions in order to encourage other countries to do what is necessary in order to preserve the nuclear nonproliferation regime is at best a misguided way to think about the problems confronting us.”⁵⁶

This position ignores the political realities of global proliferation today. Some research indicates desires for nuclear weapons may be driven more by proximate regional circumstances than distant US policy decisions. But US nuclear weapons policies gird direct US threats to the national security, and even national survival, of both North Korea and Iran. Further, increasing US reliance on nuclear deterrence and coercion reinforces perceptions of the political value of nuclear weapons possession. Treaty regimes, superpower circumspection, and a normative consensus on nuclear disarmament cannot prevent proliferation but can induce restraint. The absence of these factors is thus a permissive cause of proliferation ambitions.

Pointedly, US intransigence on its disarmament commitments at the 2005 NPT Review Conference is undermining the opportunity to forge the common stances necessary to successfully cope with North Korea's and Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. As IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stated in opening remarks to the Conference, "we must show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm. As long as some countries place strategic reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, other countries will emulate them. We cannot delude ourselves into thinking otherwise."⁵⁷

What the transatlantic partners can do

The United States's closest allies can help blunt the sharper edges of US nuclear and strategic policies and create environmental conditions more favorable to nonproliferation.

A common transatlantic stance would reaffirm NPT negative security assurances to non-nuclear states and abandon US threats to use nuclear weapons for preemptive counterproliferation (which are dubiously credible and strategically dangerous in any event⁵⁸). Such a common stance would not only promote appropriate US engagement of both North Korea and Iran, as described above, but also increase the credibility of threats still on the table: UN Security Council attention, economic sanctions and conventional force application.

To accrue the broader nonproliferation benefits of delegitimizing nuclear coercion in national security policies, European partners can push strongly to moderate wider Bush Administration nuclear ambitions. For example, European partners should quietly convey that any moves toward US resumption of nuclear testing, presaged by current nuclear infrastructure renewal, would cross a "redline" for transatlantic relations regardless of nuclear weapons developments elsewhere in the world.

NATO allies can also take more direct actions, such as minimizing reliance on nuclear deterrence in NATO defense planning, instituting a “no-first use” policy and pressing for removal of US nuclear weapons in Europe. The United Kingdom and France, nuclear-armed and permanent Security Council members, can play central roles. The UK in particular, as the other nuclear-armed member of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and a vital ally to the Bush Administration, has a unique opportunity to press for changes in NATO nuclear policy and also to set an example for US policy by opening public debate on the future of its own nuclear forces in the context of pending modernization decisions.

Finally, the transatlantic partners need to engage US policy-makers and the non-governmental strategic community on the wisdom of the Bush Administration’s conviction to pursue nonproliferation through coercion and regime change. The administration is right to believe that liberalization of the regimes in North Korea and Iran would help ease proliferation pressures; but it is wrong to believe that regime change would solve all problems, or that any liberalization in specific domestic settings can progress in the absence of corresponding pluralism and security cooperation at regional and global levels. Democratization within states cannot be promulgated successfully through unilateral messianic practices that deepen rather than bridge the divisions between states.

The end of the Cold War not only terminated the superpower nuclear arms race; it also marked a major step toward closing the great ideological battles that have defined much of modernity. But an emerging global consensus on the values of a rule of law, political and economic liberty, democracy and human security is not an “end of history.” The defining task of the twenty-first century is to refine and articulate this consensus in ways that reinforce rather than repress social, cultural and religious variance, and to institutionalize this consensus through improved global governance offering effective mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution. Not incidentally, success in this task is also a prerequisite to strengthening the NPT, reducing reliance on nuclear coercion in state security policies and progressing substantively toward the principal goal of nuclear disarmament.

The United States, as the globe’s preeminent power in political, economic and cultural as well as military terms, must lead this task; but lead through genuine unity, not “coalitions of the willing.” The Bush Administration is not wrong to orient US policy around a vision for a better world. But

America's global partners have a vital and necessary role to play in shaping that vision, and must join in its quest as well.

Notes

¹ For an assessment of the breakdown of the Agreed Framework, see Wade L. Huntley, “Ostrich Engagement: The Bush Administration and the North Korea Nuclear Crisis,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 11:2 (Summer 2004).

² James Brooke, “North Korea Says It Has Nuclear Weapons and Rejects Talks,” *New York Times*, February 10, 2005.

³ David E. Sanger, “Steps at Reactor in North Korea Worry the U.S.,” *New York Times*, April 18, 2005.

⁴ Anthony Faiola and Sachiko Sakamaki, “N. Korea Hints It Will Hold Atomic Test,” *Washington Post*, May 10, 2005 (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/09/AR2005050900466.html>).

⁵ Choe Sang-Hun, “Allies doubt future of North Korea talks,” *International Herald Tribune*, April 28, 2005 (<http://www.ihf.com/articles/2005/04/27/news/korea.php>); “Japan willing to back Security Council debate on North Korea,” *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 28, 2005, (<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20050429wo41.htm>).

⁶ Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, at the public session of the Senata Armed Services Committee, April 28, 2005. David S. Cloud and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Aide Sees Nuclear Arms Advance by North Korea,” *New York Times*, April 29, 2005; Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler, “N. Korean Nuclear Advance Is Cited,” *Washington Post*, Friday, April 29, 2005. This first-ever US official statement that North Korea had progressed this far was greeted skeptically by specialists and subsequently retracted by administration officials. See Joseph Cirincione, “Don't Panic,” May 3, 2005 (<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16840>).

⁷ On Japan's capacity, see Selig S. Harrison, ed., *Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996); for an early analysis see John E. Endicott, *Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical, and Strategic Factors* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975)

⁸ Although both have nuclear programs are less advanced than Japan's, both have demonstrated nuclear ambitions in the past, and both might be as motivated as Japan to respond to North Korean achievements.

⁹ In 1995 the Japanese Defense Agency compiled a 31-page secret report reaffirming previous government studies' conclusion that developing nuclear weapons would damage Japan's national and regional security interests. The existence of the report was disclosed by the *Asahi Shimbun* on 20 February 2003

(<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/nuke.htm>). See also Mataka Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?” *Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 63-75.

¹⁰ The *Asahi Shimbun* on 17 March 2003 quoted Vice President Richard Cheney as stating that, in response to North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles, “Japan may be forced to consider whether or not they want to readdress the nuclear issues.” (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/nuke.htm>). The comment came in the context of considerable non-governmental promotion of this prospect spurred by Charles Krauthammer, “The Japan Card,” *Washington Post*, January 3, 2003.

¹¹ See George Bunn and John Rhinelander, “The Right to Withdraw from the NPT: Article X is Not Unconditional,” *Disarmament Diplomacy* Issue No. 79, April/May 2005,

(<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd79/79gbjr.htm>); and Christer Ahlström, “Withdrawal from arms control treaties,” *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), chapter 19.

¹² “Walking the Nonproliferation Tightrope: An Interview with Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, President of the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference,” *Arms Control Today*, December 2004 (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Duarte_ACTversion.asp). Whether the 2005 NPT Review Conference will similarly swerve around the problem, in light of the apparent stalling of that process, is an open question.

¹³ Following initial reports, controversy emerged concerning how honestly US officials had informed allies that the material made its way to Libya through Pakistan, and whether North Korea was aware of its final destination – as well as the circumstantial nature of the evidence that the uranium originated in North Korea in the first place. See Dafna Linzer, “U.S. Misled Allies About Nuclear Export,” *Washington Post*, March 20, 2005; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Using Clues From Libya to Study a Nuclear Mystery,” *New York Times*, March 31, 2005.

- ¹⁴ “N.K. Nuke Test No Red Line, Former U.S. Negotiator Says,” *Chosun Ilbo*, April 28, 2005; David E. Sanger, “Bush Shifts Focus to Nuclear Sales by North Korea,” *New York Times*, May 5, 2003
- ¹⁵ No country has ever given up a publicly announced nuclear weapons capability. The only two cases of nuclear rollback – South Africa and the former Soviet republics – involved governments that had not embraced nuclear weapons in their security policies, and also were triggered by dramatic regime change.
- ¹⁶ Wiessala, Georg: *The European Union and Asian Countries* (Sheffield Academic Press/Continuum/UACES, 2002), p.110-13.
- ¹⁷ Axel Berkofsky, “EU’s Policy Towards the DPRK – Engagement or Standstill?” European Institute for Asian Studies Policy Brief, August 2003.
- ¹⁸ G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation, Sea Island Summit 2004 (<http://www.g8usa.gov/home.htm>); *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004, p.45.
- ¹⁹ For a recent summary discussion of this linkage see Joseph Cirincione and Joshua Williams, “Putting PSI into Perspective,” May 3, 2005, (<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16827>).
- ²⁰ Wiessala, Georg: *The European Union and Asian Countries* (Sheffield Academic Press/Continuum/UACES, 2002), p.9
- ²¹ Cf. Wade L. Huntley, “The Exception that Makes the Rule: North Korea & the NPT,” *Foreign Policy in Focus* (May 1, 2005).
- ²² Revati Prasad, “Iran’s Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium,” Carnegie Fact Sheet, Updated October 14, 2004 (<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/iransnuclearprogram.cfm>, accessed April 30, 2005).
- ²³ Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers, 21 October 2003 (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml). Iran agreed to abide by the Additional Protocol pending its ratification by its parliament, the Majlis.
- ²⁴ “Iran-EU Agreement on Nuclear Programme”, 14 November 2004 (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIran/eu_iran14112004.shtml). This second statement defined these activities more explicitly and noted pointedly that “this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation,” to facilitate negotiations for “a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements.”
- ²⁵ “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, 29 November 2004.
- ²⁶ Andrew Feickert, “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries,” CRS Report for Congress, Updated March 5, 2004 (<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31999.pdf>); Nazila Fathi, “Iran Confirms Test of Missile That is Able to Hit Israel,” *New York Times*, July 8, 2003.
- ²⁷ Former Iran President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Friday Prayer speech at the University of Tehran, December, 14, 2001; quoted extensively in George Perkovich, “Dealing With Iran’s Nuclear Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, April 28, 2003, pp.5-6.
- ²⁸ For a discussion of the more limited options in coping with Iran once it obtains nuclear weapons, see George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero, “The Global Consequences of Iran’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons,” April 2004.
- ²⁹ *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004, p.44. This proposal is also supported by the United States and the IAEA.
- ³⁰ Chief negotiator Rohani, cited in George Perkovich, “For Tehran, Nuclear Program Is a Matter of National Pride,” *Yale Global*, March 21, 2005 (<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16694>). The “first” discrimination is between the five NPT stipulated nuclear-armed states and its other non-nuclear parties.
- ³¹ Some officials in South Korea’s nuclear establishment continue to aspire to plutonium reprocessing capability, ostensibly in order to “close the fuel cycle,” and resent discriminatory treatment allowing Japan but not South Korea to possess reprocessed plutonium. See Jungmin Kang, et.al., “South Korea’s Nuclear Surprise,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 2005), pp.40-41.

³² George Perkovich, "For Tehran, Nuclear Program Is a Matter of National Pride, *Yale Global*, March 21, 2005 (<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16694>).

³³ See Statement By Stephen G. Rademaker, United States Assistant Secretary of State For Arms Control, To The 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, May 2, 2005, pp.4-5 (<http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2005/May/03-300542.html>).

³⁴ The relevance of Japan's capacities for considering potential proliferation consequences of North Korea's nuclear program (considered above) indicates how the existence of these capacities alone, independent of the past behavior or future intentions of the country in question, poses uncertainties and risks of nuclear weapons proliferation.

³⁵ George Perkovich, "For Tehran, Nuclear Program Is a Matter of National Pride, *Yale Global*, March 21, 2005 (<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16694>).

³⁶ Indeed, the United States joined France and Japan in opposing a five-year global moratorium on all new enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of plutonium, which Iran also opposed. David E. Sanger, "Threats by Iran and North Korea Shadow Talks on Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, May 1, 2005.

³⁷ This is essentially the view of IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei: "I cannot tell you what the optimum fuel cycle control mechanism should look like, but I am convinced it should be different from what we have today. And above all, it must be equitable and effective." Statement By Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, 2 May 2005 (<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n006.html>).

³⁸ "Iran: Time for a New Approach," Report of an Independent Task Force (Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Co-Chairs), Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, pp.11,13.

³⁹ George Perkovich, "Dealing With Iran's Nuclear Challenge," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, April 28, 2003, p.3.

⁴⁰ "Iran: Time for a New Approach," Report of an Independent Task Force (Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Co-Chairs), Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, p.9; George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero, "The Global Consequences of Iran's Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," April 2004, p.5. This kind of political pressure may prove more valuable than economic pressure; although Iran depends heavily on oil exports, importers of Iranian oil would also suffer costs which would restrict their willingness to employ this tactic for nonproliferation goals.

⁴¹ George Perkovich, "Dealing With Iran's Nuclear Challenge," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, April 28, 2003, pp.6-8.

⁴² "Iran: Time for a New Approach," Report of an Independent Task Force (Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Co-Chairs), Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, p.23.

⁴³ For example, US or Israeli air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities would almost certainly tap resentment of past US interventions in Iran across its political spectrum, fueling anti-US nationalism, and would likely undercut existing moderate dissent, setting back prospects for indigenous regime reform.

⁴⁴ For contrasting views, see "Iran: Time for a New Approach," Report of an Independent Task Force (Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Co-Chairs), Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, pp.47-51.

⁴⁵ George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero, "The Global Consequences of Iran's Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," April 2004, p.21.

⁴⁶ "Iran: Time for a New Approach," Report of an Independent Task Force (Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Co-Chairs), Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, p.39.

⁴⁷ "Iran: Time for a New Approach," Report of an Independent Task Force (Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Co-Chairs), Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, pp.44-45,52; George Perkovich, "Dealing With Iran's Nuclear Challenge," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, April 28, 2003, pp.2-3; cf. inter alia Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore in, "Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb," *Survival* (vol. 44, no. 2) Summer 2002, p. 53.

⁴⁸ George Perkovich, "Dealing With Iran's Nuclear Challenge," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, April 28, 2003, pp.10-11.

⁴⁹ See George Perkovich, "Iran Is Not an Island: A Strategy to Mobilize the Neighbors," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, February 2005, p.2

⁵⁰ See Peter Rudolf, “The United States, Iran and Transatlantic Relations,” SWP Comments 23, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, September 2004.

⁵¹ See George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero, “The Global Consequences of Iran’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons,” April 2004, pp.31-2.

⁵² For critical overviews, see Levi, Michael A., “Fire in the Hole: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options for Counterproliferation,” Carnegie Endowment Working Paper #31, November 2002; and Alexander, Brian and Alistair Millar, eds., *Tactical Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 2003).

⁵³ Michael M. May, “The U.S. Enlargement Strategy and Nuclear Weapons,” Working Paper, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, March 2000.

⁵⁴ *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, White House, December 2002, p.4.

⁵⁵ For an elaboration of this analysis, see Wade L. Huntley, “Threats All The Way Down: U.S. Strategic Initiatives in a Unipolar World,” *Review of International Studies* (forthcoming).

⁵⁶ Testimony to Congress, cited in Carol Giacomo, “U.S. Rules Out Concessions to Shore Up Nuclear Pact,” Reuters, April 28, 2005.

⁵⁷ Statement By Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, 2 May 2005 (<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n006.html>).

⁵⁸ See Scott Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapon Attacks,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000).