

COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY PROGRAM

Journalism and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Societies in Transition

A Report of the Aspen Institute
International Roundtable on Journalism

Craig L. LaMay, Rapporteur

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Communications and Society Program

Charles M. Firestone

Executive Director

Washington, DC

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The Aspen Institute
Publications Office
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109 Houghton Lab Lane
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For all other inquiries, please contact:

The Aspen Institute
Communications and Society Program
One Dupont Circle, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 736-5818
Fax: (202) 467-0790

Charles M. Firestone
Executive Director

Amy Korzick Garmer
Associate Director

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Foreword

The media worldwide are undergoing dramatic changes that reflect the powerful global economic and political forces that have been unleashed by the end of the cold war. The demise of the bipolar world and the success of Western or American political and economic power have raised the following questions: What interests and values are the increasingly global media propagating? Should global media propagate these interests and values to societies of great social, linguistic, and cultural diversity?

The media's values are central to the ongoing debates about media concentration and access, penetration into fragile societies, and conveyance of powerful images and other content that easily shapes the reality of millions of people. Traditional wisdom posits that media are merely a mirror to society, but this idea is a truly passive view of one of the most dynamic sectors of contemporary society.

In these debates, one might take a rather different view of the media in society. To follow the imagery, I suggest the media serve society as more than just a mirror, passively reflecting back to us our trials, triumphs, and tribulations, warts and all! In many parts of the world, the media's function remains principally to focus public attention on areas of society that require intervention—from governments, inter, or non-governmental actors, and the public itself. To perform this task, the media act as prisms, bringing clarity and sharp focus to issues in their simplicity and complexity.

This rather mechanical view of the media, however, is enriched by the content it carries. I would argue that relieving human suffering, and celebrating both small personal victories and large human accomplishments should be the core mission of the media. The media's content must be guided by values that support the strengthening of the infrastructure of ideas in people wherever they live; support their identity; support community and citizenship; and support human equality and social justice. In short, the media's content must be guided by values that support democracy and respect everyone's fundamental human rights.

The media graphically, and not always impartially, have recorded the collapse of this infrastructure of ideas, which is often taken for

granted. Whether in Europe in the 1940s, in Cambodia in the 1970s, in former Yugoslavia or Rwanda in the 1990s, values that would have defended people against needless devastation and suffering were distorted, desecrated, or simply ignored. The consequences remain with us in this new millennium. For those people interested in the media either as professionals or ordinary citizens, these events provide a sobering background to questions of how the media, an increasingly powerful social and political tool, can be made more responsive to human needs and dreams, without sacrificing its commitment to telling the truth impartially and independently, especially in emerging democracies.

The Aspen Institute and the Ford Foundation, seized by these same concerns, convened an international meeting on the theme "Principles and Practices of a Free and Responsible Press," and invited media practitioners from around the world to deliberate on these questions in May 2000, at the Wye River Conference Center in Maryland. I recommend reading the record of these fascinating deliberations and commend the Aspen Institute for its commitment to bringing wider public understanding and building new knowledge about the positive role the media can play in our democratizing societies throughout the world.

I hope future convenings support the development of a more professional journalism worldwide and complement the public's need for a media sector committed to promoting and defending fundamental rights and values. These rights which include freedom of the press, expression, and association, should be valued and shared by all people wherever they happen to live in our rapidly shrinking world.

In this respect, I would like to pay tribute to Carlos Cardoso, an African journalist whose career I believe epitomizes both the professionalism and social commitment we discussed during the meeting at Wye River. For over twenty years, Mr. Cardoso fought as a combatant and political activist for freedom from Portuguese colonial rule in his country, Mozambique. After independence in 1975, he worked as a journalist, government media director, and finally as editor of an independent newspaper. His newspaper fearlessly exposed corruption and economic crimes in newly democratizing Mozambique. In November 2000, as Mr. Cardoso left his office in downtown Maputo, he was accosted, shot, and killed instantly by unknown assailants

believed to be people angered by his relentless efforts to expose and rout out corruption in Mozambique. His wife and two young children survive the late Carlos Cardoso.

Joseph B. Gitari
Program Officer
Human Rights and Social Justice
The Ford Foundation (Eastern Africa)
Nairobi, Kenya
February 2001

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We also owe a great deal of thanks to the extensive work of our conference rapporteur, Craig LaMay, who has brought order to chaos in writing a report of the conference proceedings, and done so in an eloquent and eminently readable way. Our gratitude also goes to Monroe Price, Joseph and Sadie Danciger Professor of Law and Director of the Howard M. Squadron Program in Media, Law, and Society at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, for lending his time and advice as consultant to this project. We also want to thank each of the participants, who gave us some of their valuable time to assist the Ford Foundation and other organizations in thinking about strategies for supporting freedom of expression and promoting responsible, independent journalism worldwide. We would also like to express our appreciation to the Aspen Institute personnel who assisted in the production of this report: Jacqueline Arendse for her editing; Chris Boardwine and Steve Johnson for layout; and Sunny Sumter-Sana for coordinating the conference and managing the publication of this report.

Amy Korzick Garmer
Director, Journalism Projects
and
Associate Director
Communications and Society Program
The Aspen Institute

Journalism and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Societies in Transition

Introduction

The post-Cold War period has presented an opportunity unmatched since the end of World War II to restructure the media systems of much of the world. Free of political repression or ideological constraint, media in developing and developed nations have had the opportunity to ask: Consistent with democratic principles, what should a media system look like? And more specifically for countries emerging from authoritarian rule, what news media practices promote democratization?

The Aspen Institute Communications and Society Program, in partnership with the Ford Foundation, convened the first Aspen Institute International Roundtable on Journalism, "Principles and Practice of a Free and Responsible Press: Lessons from Societies in Conflict and Transition," at the Wye River Conference Center in late spring 2000 to examine the conditions necessary for developing and sustaining vigorous and professional journalism practice in emerging democracies. More nations than ever before are nominally democratic, though many still labor under legal, economic, and political obstacles extant from more repressive regimes, and everywhere cultural factors—among them religion, race, and ethnicity—affect the pace and process of democratization. In some regions—the Balkans, Central and Western Africa, Indonesia, to name the most obvious—these social and cultural legacies have led to violent conflict.

As with the post-war period, some media restructuring over the last decade has been the result of international military intervention, for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina and more recently in Kosovo. The difference between the current period and the post-war period, however, is the greater involvement today of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as, in the Balkan case, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), of which some 1,600 are registered with the United Nations.

Law professor Monroe Price, a participant at the conference, has observed that the international community generally takes one of two approaches to media development.* One has been essentially a top-down approach, to create under IGO control alternative sources of information that are in structure and in content, "neutral and peace-oriented." The other is a bottom-up approach, more commonly used by NGOs, that focuses on "strengthening local, indigenous media outlets, particularly those that strike a new voice, in the hopes of building a public sphere, a civil society, and the long-term machinery for peace and reconstruction."

The Aspen Institute conferees—most of them journalists from developing nations in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America—were generally critical of such democratization and media development efforts by NGOs and IGOs, faulting the efforts for being too often culturally inappropriate or, for various reasons, ineffective or unsustainable. Sometimes they are simply counterproductive. The top-down approach to media development, Price observed, is apt to alienate locals, including journalists, who see it as foreign, offensive, or even hostile to their interests. Moreover, where the approach succeeds it may do so at the cost of weakening indigenous media that cannot compete with a heavily subsidized, well-equipped news organization. If that organization later collapses when international support is withdrawn, the net effect of intervention may be a media system as weak or weaker than existed at the point of intervention. The bottom-up approach to intervention, on the other hand, must by design find its way through a media environment where, particularly in post-conflict societies, media organizations are likely to be partisan rather than independent, and reporting standards are often low or in decline.¹

Given the limitations to these two approaches, Price said, perhaps the international community should step back and ask itself a few questions: What factors constitute a basis for international intervention in another nation's media system? What interventions are necessary or desirable? What are the limitations of intervention? In response to these

*Professor Price, Danciger Professor of Law at the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University, submitted an excellent background paper on these subjects. See Monroe E. Price, ed., *Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives, the Experience of Intergovernmental and Non-Governmental Organizations*. University of Oxford: Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, May 2000.

questions, the conferees' concerns fell broadly into four areas. They agreed that positive results could occur by:

- Promoting *governmental reform*, in particular reform of constitutional and statutory restrictions on journalism and the development of a strong, independent judiciary system supportive of expressive rights;
- Developing *professionalism* among journalists and in news organizations through the creation of external mechanisms (such as journalists' associations) and internal ones (such as ombudsmen) that set and enforce standards of practice, and through developing training programs for journalists, particularly in ethics but also in specialized substantive areas of importance to regional and local audiences;
- Supporting the development of *civil society*; and
- Promoting the development of a *sustainable communications infrastructure*.

Two important subtexts wove through the discussion on these four areas, and they provide the context around which this narrative is organized. The first concerned the role of free expression in a civil society; the second concerned the relationship between journalism and democracy in the age of economic and information globalism.

Press Responsibility: Free Expression in a Civil Society

In many emerging democracies, media law and a culture supportive of free expression are works in progress, dependent on enabling political, social, and economic conditions that, if they exist, are fragile.² Throughout the developing world, for instance, government restrictions on the press commonly come in the form of litigation for offenses such as criminal, blasphemous, and civil libel, and violations of national security or emergency regulations. Generally, licensing requirements for journalists and severe restrictions on access to government information still characterize many developing societies. Several conference participants complained of "antiquated" press laws and inadequate constitutions that enable governments to regulate expression through the power of the raised eyebrow—or, should they choose, prosecution or brute force.

Such antiquities are common even in media systems of developed countries, and are usually rooted in the experience of some earlier political regime or technological era. Israel's defense regulations, for example, were imposed during British rule in Palestine and incorporated into Israeli law after independence. The regulations allow official censorship and the detention of journalists, and Israel uses them to control coverage of military affairs.

The issue, ultimately, is not whether archaic laws and regulations exist but how they are used. Britain, for example, is a fairly benign country with respect to press rights, and its media are among the most vibrant in the world. British press law, however, is restrictive, and there exist no fewer than forty-eight nations in the world, many of them former colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, where both the legacy of British law and repressive governments persist. These governments use their legal leverage "to impose regimes of self-censorship," said Lin Neumann of the Southeast Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA); the result is as effective, if less obvious, than direct state censorship.

Economic obstacles also militate against independent (non-state) media development. In Africa, for instance, endemic poverty has among its consequences poor educational opportunity, inadequate technological infrastructure, ethnic violence, and war. In Central and Eastern Europe, many of the powerful state broadcasters have yet to develop any meaningful public service governance or programming; independent news media in the region have been unable to make capital investments or pay adequate salaries, are often burdened by fines or taxes, and cannot afford to invest in staff training or development.

Other common problems that confront good journalism in emerging democracies include "envelope journalism," or bribery, and self-censorship in the name of national or cultural values. Governments sometimes use their power to purchase or withhold subsidies, usually in the form of advertising, in order to influence reporting. Legal, cultural, or institutional buffers between journalism and government suppression are thin and few, and one of the most important institutional buffers, the judiciary, is often an instrument of the ruling party. Finally, threats to journalists' safety make independent reporting a very risky enterprise in many places. Reporters sans Frontieres, an NGO, reported that in 1998-99 nineteen journalists were killed worldwide. For the same period, the International Press Institute put the number killed at fifty.

(The conference participants assembled a list of conditions that promote press freedom and another list of common factors that militate against it. See Graphics A and B on pages 6 and 7).

Against realities such as these, the Aspen Institute conferees asked, what are the minimal enabling conditions necessary for a developing society to cultivate a free press or, more generally, public understanding and appreciation for free expression? And reciprocally, what tensions exist between the desire to promote freedom of expression and the desire to build a civil society? By what mechanisms, and by whom, are expressive freedoms—and especially press freedoms—to be balanced against social stability? Can there even be such a balancing, or are some social and political risks simply unavoidable in a free and open society?

In many developed nations these questions have been asked and, in one fashion or another, answered over a period of decades, sometimes centuries. The answers typically come by way of legal provisions—in constitutions, statutes, common law, and administrative law—and through the habits of journalism practice and cultural predilection. The confluence of these factors—law, journalistic practice, and cultural predilection—determines the balance of "freedom" and "responsibility" in a media system, and so while there may be some general principles of media development, there are few templates for their execution.

Free Expression Theory and Reality

The Aspen conferees began their deliberations with a discussion of free expression theory and the work of American legal scholar Thomas Emerson, whose justifications for limiting restrictions on speech fall into two broad and overlapping categories, the personal (or private) and the communal (or public). According to Emerson, free expression is important for the following reasons:

- Free expression allows people to develop their intellectual and spiritual faculties through their own activities and through engagement with others in art, religion, public affairs, and so on. The importance of free expression in this regard is made obvious by the experience of totalitarian regimes, where even in their private lives people must be wary of what they say and to whom, and even those who wish to conform—to say nothing of those who do not—have no *choice* in the matter.

- Free expression promotes the search for spiritual, intellectual, and civic truths, and these truths can best be discerned in an environment that allows all ideas to present themselves for debate. Here again the experience of totalitarian societies is instructive. Such societies often suppress not only political and cultural ideas, but scientific ones that conflict with official doctrine or the views of powerful institutions like the army, the religious authorities, or a ruling political party. Clearly, in a society where some topics are off limits and others hold favored positions, truth must take a tortured path to the light.
- Free expression is necessary for democratic self-governance. Obviously if the people are to be sovereign and free elections are to have any meaning, the people need to be able to assemble, to exchange ideas, and to circulate information related to public affairs. The press, in particular, must be free to investigate and criticize the government and to check abuses of state power, since even where governments are accepting of free expression they cannot be expected to use their powers to favor any interests but their own.

Graphic A: Enabling Conditions for Press Freedom




- Free expression works as a kind of social safety valve, and thus works better than suppression in maintaining social order. This view of free expression values tolerance both for its own sake and for its ability to channel dissent into peaceful social change.

For the most part, conference participants accepted these justifications, but they also saw adherence to them as a luxury that few developing nations could afford. In some cases, they saw these justifications as cruel abstractions. As participant Ibrahim Nawar, chairman of Arab Press Freedom Watch, put it, "The right of survival comes before the right to free speech. In Iraq, for example, people are suffering and they would laugh at you if you talked about freedom of expression." Kabral Blay-Amihere, president of the West African Journalists Association, observed that on a daily basis in Ghana "consumers must choose between buying bread and buying a newspaper. Many people in my country make the equivalent of fifteen U.S. dollars per month."

More generally, when measured against the facts, Emerson's theoretical justifications have serious shortcomings even in stable democracies. It is not at all clear, for example, that "truth" results from an open and earnest search for the truth, and results matter. Americans may tolerate hate speech they find repulsive; Rwandans, Bosnians, and Kosovars have

Graphic B: Limiting Factors for Press Freedom



found it fatal. Must a free and open society accept the likelihood that some speech will be avowedly anti-democratic, and that some people will invariably find self-realization through expression that is anti-social?

Most of the participants thought not. Alexej Simonov, president of Russia's Glasnost Defense Foundation, described a false television news report aired in his country that resulted in an ethnic riot and several deaths and stated flatly that unrestrained expression is "absolutely unacceptable" when "freedom of expression becomes dangerous to the freedom of the country." David Makali, director of Kenya's Media Institute and editor of *Expression Today*, expressed a similar view: "I have no doubt that freedom of expression requires some sort of regulation, since absolute freedom of expression has contributed to the destruction of societies such as Rwanda. The preservation of society depends on the promotion of progressive ideas over negative ones, and freedom of the press doesn't mean general public freedom of expression. Indeed, freedom of the press can work against the public's freedoms."

One danger in this view—which all the conferees recognized—is that a view of free expression that focuses narrowly on promoting stable self-government may be less tolerant of dissenting ideas in "non-political" areas like art, literature, and religion—for many people the very things that make democracy worth supporting in the first place. More generally, of course, the process of sorting out protected speech from unprotected speech is inevitably arbitrary and susceptible to abuse.

Finally, as several conferees said, equating the mere fact of participation in the marketplace of ideas with meaningful decision-making on the part of all society's participants almost certainly claims too much. People everywhere link free speech with economic power, in developing societies and in the global media marketplace. Moreover, as media scholar James Carey has observed, societies with few legal restrictions may nonetheless have a system of expression controlled by a few powerful interests; restrictive, even authoritarian societies, may have a rich, flourishing—a more democratic, if less open—culture of expression and communication.³

Perhaps the most useful insight from this part of the conferees' discussion was that there is no single underlying and unifying theory that

supports freedom of expression, and more importantly, that no such theory is desirable. Indeed, it may be preferable from a social-acceptance point of view that free expression has not one justification but many, mutually reinforcing ones.

Press Freedom and Civil Society

For many of the conferees the discussion about expression theory reduced to a practical question: Which is more urgent, establishing freedom of expression or establishing the conditions of civil society that make expression meaningful? Effectively circumventing the chicken-and-egg nature of the question, Sheila Coronel, executive director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, put the matter this way:

I think freedom of expression is good for its own sake, regardless of the consequences. But, it doesn't guarantee anything. It doesn't guarantee fulfillment; it doesn't guarantee stability. We take the risk and we can have the exact opposite results of what we hope for. The social good that comes from free expression depends on social contexts—basic survival is necessary first or else free expression becomes a right of the elite. Many of us come from countries that lack a number of important enabling conditions—a diversity of media outlets, peace, and stability, a culture of tolerance, an economic system that meets people's basic needs. This raises some questions about what our role is as journalists. How do we use our freedoms to make free expression available to a majority of citizens?

Coronel's formulation of the issues fits well within the tradition of civil society thought, which is concerned with the institutions that comprise the non-governmental sector of society—churches, neighborhoods, families, clubs, and civic groups, and so on. These institutions are characterized by voluntary association and perform a number of important social functions: they provide a buffer between the individual and the power of the state and the market; they create social capital; and they develop democratic values and habits. Civil society, in short,

provides to democracy what the law, with its rules and sanctions, cannot—social trust, social authority, civic virtue, and vision—the stuff of citizenship. It is an oversimplification, but not too much of one, to say that fundamentally civil society is about social responsibility. This idea as it has developed in modern times stands in opposition to the Western tradition of liberal individualism and its tendency to see people either as bundles of legal rights and entitlements, cut off from any higher moral claims, or as consumers motivated only by economic self-interest.⁴

Journalism, depending on how one defines the term, fits awkwardly into the mix of institutions that comprise civil society. One view of journalism sees its role as building civic consciousness and social solidarity (for example, the "public journalism" movement in the United States). A more traditional view—the so-called "fourth estate" view—follows closely on free expression theory and sees journalism as institutionalizing the expressive freedoms that provide a moderating influence on sources of power. A third model of journalism, one often promoted with respect to developing nations, is less democratic than it is developmental; it sees journalism as promoting socio-economic change through education, economic expansion, and growth. This model is not necessarily anti-democratic, but places politics second to development, which is its priority.

In each of these models, journalism is a business, sometimes of a kind that links it financially or editorially to government. By being linked to government, journalism usually lacks the characteristic of voluntary association that defines civil society institutions. Ideally, however, journalism shares with those institutions devotion to a larger public purpose. Still, in a society where free association is possible, journalists have organized themselves into numerous voluntary associations whose broad purposes are to improve press performance and enhance public service. Typically most of these organizations acknowledge that the corollary of press freedom is press responsibility, and some—press councils, for instance—also provide mechanisms for the public to hold journalists accountable for shoddy work.

With respect to responsibility, journalism again fits uneasily in traditional norms of civil society. To many journalists, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with media, "responsibility" is a code word that signals government restrictions on media activity

whenever the government deems such activity "irresponsible." Several NGOs, for instance, have objected to the provision on free expression in the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 10, Section 2), which begins "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression," and continues "the exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation of the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."

Despite the obvious potential for government abuse in such language, forty member countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) subscribe to it. Many new democracies in Europe have used the same or similar language in drafting their media laws, and throughout the Aspen Institute conference several participants spoke—as Kwame Karikari, executive director of the Media Foundation for West Africa, did—of the need "to balance the rights of individual and community."

Most developed democratic governments officially view "freedom" as the result of non-restrictive government policies towards the media and "responsibility" as the product of self-regulation—a view that most of the journalists at the conference shared. However, in both established and emerging democracies, this principle probably works better in theory than it does in practice. One of the common features of an emerging democracy is an increasing number of people who call themselves journalists, but who are untrained and unprofessional. In both established and emerging democracies, the Internet exacerbates this trend. Finally, in many developed media systems the ever widening acceptance of the marketplace as the best arbiter of press performance has led to greater reliance on sensational over serious journalism and many well publicized compromises in journalism ethics; not surprisingly, it has also led to renewed focus on press accountability. Presumably governments and journalists will in time mature and come to grips with their new freedoms, meanwhile, both must deal with the very real grievances and dangers that define the present.

Many journalists categorically reject the view that journalistic performance is in any way compromised by complete freedom in favor of a more absolutist approach to free expression. Americans in particular take this view, and indeed raised it in the 1997 negotiations with the Council of Europe that gave rise to the OSCE's creation of an office to promote freedom of the media. The United States' experience with free expression is unique in that to a degree unmatched anywhere the First Amendment protects speech that, in Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' words, "we loathe and believe to be fraught with death."

Beyond the example of the First Amendment, the absolutist approach to free expression suffers from defects both as theory and as history. Despite Holmes' words (indeed, perhaps because of them) the American system of free expression is not absolutist, nor could it be. All speech is conduct but not all conduct is speech, and taken literally, absolutism is unable to distinguish between the two. Thus absolutism not only makes a civil society impossible, but it plays into the hands of authoritarian governments that promise freedom of speech but arbitrarily punish dissenting or controversial speech as prohibited conduct.

Historically, the liberal American position on speech is relatively new. In the nineteenth century—the United States' own emerging democracy period—free speech law was state law, and state constitutions typically linked the right to speak freely with the obligation to speak responsibly. Beginning in 1931 and particularly since 1964, the United States Supreme Court has moved far from that view with respect to the press, but its legacy is still evident in some core doctrinal areas (prior restraint, for instance), and in the Court's respect for the police powers of the state (for example, the use of time, place, and manner restrictions).

Another feature of the American media system—and increasingly media systems everywhere—that runs counter to civil society thinking is its heavy reliance on the purchasing and viewing habits of consumers as the most credible measure of press performance. American journalism has historically eschewed critical evaluation both from within its ranks (ombudsmen and media critics) and from outside (commissions and academic studies); self-regulation is informal and, to the public, pretty much invisible. This leaves the law as the only meaningful tool of redress for alleged press wrongs. The result, several legal commentators

have noted, is ironic: It is primarily judges—officers of the state—who establish the de facto rules of press accountability in the United States, not the news media themselves. This enlarges the role of government in public life and strains it beyond its competency, both roles being anathema to civil society adherents. Whether for those reasons or others, participants at the conference saw self-regulation as a means of maintaining press independence from the state.

Journalism, Democracy, and Democratization

The conferees' opening discussions on free expression and civil society implicitly and repeatedly raised a straightforward question: What is it about journalism practice that makes it important to democracy, or in emerging societies, to democratization? In the last decade, with the rise of what Lin Neumann called the "global democratization movement," a lot of money has been spent on media development on the assumption that it is essential to democracy, but without much thought about the forms that either journalism or democracy might take.

There have been a number of scholarly studies on media systems in the post-Cold War period, most of them descriptive. Professor Guy Berger of Rhodes University in South Africa conceptually categorized media systems into four variants:⁷

- *Liberal*, or the classic Fourth Estate model, in which journalism is an independent source of social power that provides a check on both state and private power. The liberal model sees journalism primarily as a private enterprise rather than a state one, and as such, the common criticism is that its independence is too easily compromised by private interests—owners, advertisers, public relations firms, and others.
- *Neoliberal*, in which journalism is the primary advocate for cultural pluralism, giving voice to minority and dissident voices against the dominant political views in the media system. The neoliberal model is premised on public debate, and in much of the world has been a response to authoritarian political regimes.
- *Social democratic*, in which journalism performs a public role more akin to guide than guardian. In this view, journalists do

not stand in an adversarial role to power so much as frame the terms of citizenship, define and shape democratic culture. Large public-service state broadcasters like the BBC or NHK epitomize the social democratic model.

- *Participatory*, in which journalism is neither guide nor guardian, but actively promotes the voluntary associations and political habits of civil society. Where social democratic journalism concerns itself with the formation of the nation, participatory journalism concerns itself with the formation of communities. And unlike neoliberal journalism, which sees citizens primarily as consumers of politics, the participatory model sees them as political actors. Participatory journalism is relatively new; it is exemplified in the United States by the public journalism movement, and around the world by attempts to use the Internet as a tool of political organization and action.

These models overlap in some obvious ways. Many state broadcasters, for example, see themselves not merely as nurturing their nation's culture, but also as serving as a watchdog on government (liberal model) and, as many state broadcasters are required to do, giving voice to minority viewpoints (neoliberal model). Similarly, those who see journalism as a Fourth Estate are likely to believe that their work increases public knowledge and thus makes citizen participation in government meaningful.

These models are useful as tools of analysis because they function differently in developing democracies than they do in developed ones. In developed nations, for instance, it is increasingly difficult to see how some of these models function except as idealized norms. Throughout the developed world, journalism has become a small part of a larger media environment that includes entertainment, sports, music, advertising, and direct marketing. As other Aspen Institute papers have noted, the mixing of content and purpose puts journalism in an increasingly competitive environment, thus privileging news content that is easily leveraged across multiple media platforms. These trends are amplified by globalization and media deregulation, both of which have unleashed additional competitive forces. The liberal journalism tradition is not dead—it lives in some elite media and also in some decidedly un-elite media, primarily on the Internet, that report on both public affairs and on the failings of the Fourth Estate.

In much of the developing world, the liberal journalistic tradition is not only alive and kicking, but owes its existence to the very factors that repress it—especially inept or corrupt governments. Participants noted the irony that in many of the societies represented at the conference, journalism was in key respects better when it was officially suppressed. In some cases, said Sheila Coronel, good journalism that survived in the worst of political and social conditions now has to succeed financially against competition from a variety of other outlets, including many that trade in entertainment and sensationalism. "Tyranny of the state may be better than tyranny of the market," she said. "As journalists we knew what to do with the state—you topple it. But what do you do with the market?"

Liberal and Neoliberal Journalism in Developing Societies

Coronel's question gets at an important problem: For journalists in developing societies, the liberal and neoliberal journalistic traditions are not necessarily conducive to democratization. The liberal tradition, for example, supports vigorous and effective monitoring of the government, and its emphasis on private ownership provides a needed counterweight to what are often government-held monopolies in media. The neoliberal push for pluralism is also essential to democratization, if not also to civil society.

However, there is nothing about the liberal model that makes it inherently democratic, and as several participants at the conference argued, the ethical excesses of the liberal model may undermine public support for free expression. Maciej Wierzynski, director of Voice of America's Polish Service, described a situation in which Poland's two small private television networks have curried political favor in order to insulate themselves from competition. "One of the private networks," he said, "bribed the whole parliamentary caucus to preserve the 30 percent limit on foreign investment and block the flow of foreign capital to the media market."

Private media can subvert democratic impulses in other ways as well. If, for instance, the media see their role primarily as promoting economic development or social stability, they can devolve into nothing more than a mouthpiece for an undemocratic government. The effect is to further entrench established interests, in government and in the private

sector. Participant Rosa María Alfaro of the Asociación de Comunicadores Sociales (CALANDRIA) of Peru said that in Latin America "political parties and government buy journalists with advertising," effectively securing favorable treatment through patronage. Basma El Husseiny, a Ford Foundation program officer based in Egypt, made a similar observation about journalists in her country, and characterized some as "mercenaries."

At the other extreme, liberal journalism can threaten democratization when it becomes a source of political opposition in its own right or, as often happens, when a nominally independent press becomes the tool of politicians opposed to the government, as happened with the late Massoud Abiola in Nigeria. When this happens, journalistic values are subverted to political agendas, even more so when the opposition press scores a victory at the ballot box and then becomes the government press—and thus loses its liberal character entirely, to the point where it may retard or subvert democratization.

In developing media systems, globalization and deregulation have also been a mixed bag. Deregulation has often meant an exchange of one monopoly (government) with another (private), as in Russia, where virtually all the nation's non-government media are now controlled by about three large industrial conglomerates; this oligopoly is closely linked to sources of political and economic power and thus has found it hard to resist government threats and pressure. While globalization has led to some foreign investment in developing nations, such investment does not always translate into greater diversity of content and often has the effect of diminishing domestic programming in favor of imported American programming.

Globalization in developing societies has also meant the involvement of NGOs and outside funders, which have their own social and political agendas. From the point of view of those on the receiving end of such aid, it was clear from discussion at the conference that much of it—no matter what its source or the motivations behind it—was misdirected and some utterly wasteful.

Indonesian journalist Andreas Harsono argued, to general agreement, that many international organizations are considerably more concerned with their own interests than in the needs of those whom they purport to serve. At worst, he said, some NGOs exist only to perpetuate themselves, and others, even when they mean well, "are not

always helpful and sometimes are presumptuous. The people they send do not know a country's culture or history. Many international NGOs do not have a long-standing interest or purpose in a country and so do nothing to build local capacity. They often bypass local democratic processes, and so do not solve problems but make them worse."

Illustrating Harsono's point, Kabral Blay-Amihere, president of the West African Journalists Association, described a £15,000 British training program in Ghana in which, he charged, only £2,000 went to actual training—the rest went to overhead, including the cost of supporting two tutors sent from the United Kingdom. Lin Neumann told of an NGO operating in Southeast Asia that received a \$500,000 grant for no other reason than that the grantor was under deadline pressure to find a grantee.

While the conferees did not discuss it at length, they seemed to agree that one reason for the clumsiness of Western aid is that it is often driven by the so-called "CNN effect"—the process by which international attention, governmental and non-governmental, is focused on a region by virtue of television news coverage. "The response to crisis is then often blown out of proportion," said Sharmini Peries, executive director of the Canadian Journalists Association, which operates the International Freedom of Expression Exchange. "There is a flood of support and afterward there is total abandonment." The consequences of the intervention may nonetheless linger, said Basma El Husseiny: "International agencies reorder the priorities, sometimes harmfully."

The aid and development community's perspective on these issues received little attention at the conference, since no one was there to represent it, but a few points seem obvious. NGOs and IGOs can indeed become large, agenda-driven institutions that need to maintain a funding base; they can be competitive and even counterproductive. That does not mean the people working for them are always inexperienced or unknowledgeable. Quite the contrary. Moreover, those working in the field can spend an inordinate amount of time negotiating with political, cultural, and military authorities at the local, national, and occasionally, international level, making even incremental changes difficult. In this regard, errors of fact and outright misrepresentations by journalists are problems for the aid community, particularly in regions where media are themselves divided into warring camps. Finally, the value of any particular program—despite the division between "real

training" and "overhead"—will always be subjective. If anything, this part of the conference discussion underscored the importance of donor priorities to the flow of international aid, but offered little of value to say about it.

Social Democratic Journalism in Developing Societies

In developed media systems, one response to globalization and to the excesses of the liberal journalism model has been to give renewed emphasis to the social democratic model typified by public broadcasting. Speaking at the spring conference, the Aspen Institute's Charles Firestone asked whether governments could not play a valuable role in facilitating and safeguarding diversity of expression, and particularly in the modern era, whether government might not be a necessary countervailing force against the large concentrations of private economic power in the media marketplace. Through direct or indirect intervention, government may—among other things—promote public access to the means of communication, encourage and regulate competition, and subsidize high-quality news, public affairs, and cultural fare that the market may not support.

Participants had mixed feelings about the government's ability to play a positive role in news and public affairs. Even where governments are ostensibly acting in the "public interest," said Maciej Wierzynski, the legacy of state control makes for an uneasy partnership. "Anytime we try to discuss the role of government in media it leads to political questions," he said. "Who controls? Who sets the priorities? In the case of Poland, state-owned media have played the decisive role in electronic media on the rationale that they are protecting 'national culture' against foreign television. As a result, we have a situation where national culture is not so much protected, but the government makes political appointments to state radio and television."

It is not uncommon for journalists in democratizing nations to reject the social democratic journalism model, which in their experience has been used primarily as a tool of domination. But more recent experience with privatization has led some to modify this view: Albeit imperfect, government involvement in the news media at least allows for public scrutiny and accountability. Discussing the possibility of privatization of state broadcasting in Ghana, Kwame Karikari worried that privatization would result in a system peopled by "cronies" of the ruling party.

"If broadcasting is still a civil service, we can demand that it really serve the public interest. If it is just a front, we can do nothing."

Participatory Journalism in Developing Societies

Participatory journalism—much scorned in developing nations—has obvious appeal in developing societies. It emphasizes the kinds of civic associations that promote civil society, and in societies emerging from authoritarian pasts no single institution can advance the cause of democratization. Participatory journalism also reaches out to the large numbers of people, particularly in rural areas, who have traditionally been both socially marginalized and beyond the reach of virtually every public affairs medium except state radio.

Critics of participatory journalism charge that it is susceptible to abuse. This may be especially true in societies without a tradition of independent media. Further, the impediments to independent journalism in developing societies—poverty, high illiteracy rates, scattered populations, and poor infrastructure—are particularly injurious to the goals of participatory journalism.⁸ The Internet, for example, has been widely praised as the first mass medium that allows for interactivity and community building—and thus ideally suited to participatory journalism—but poverty and limited information infrastructure make the Internet unavailable to a majority of people in many developing societies.

The Role for International Organizations in Promoting Free Press and Civil Society

Because so many of the conference participants were from the international development community, a great deal of discussion focused on what international organizations could do to support the enabling conditions of press freedom and civil society. Generally, the participants agreed that IGOs and NGOs need to place greater emphasis on local and regional programs that will sustain themselves after crises and start-up funding are passed. Indigenous media, in turn, must better identify and articulate their own needs to the international community. Specifically, the conferees identified two categories of need that require focused attention: infrastructure development and professional development (training and institutional support) for journalists. The

two are in some obvious ways mutually supporting and, as discussed below, the participants thought of professional development as less an exercise in instruction than one in social engineering, in building the civil society.

Infrastructure Support

Some infrastructure needs are clearly material ones. Particularly in societies in conflict, said Kwame Karikari, "Media houses have become targets, as in Sierra Leone and Liberia." International organizations, he urged, should make capital investments if they want to make a lasting difference. "Invest in a printing press and get a journalistic organization to run it as an independent company," he said. "Support it with management training." Such investments do not have to be large.

Still another material need identified by several participants—and one clearly linked to journalism professionalism—are journalism schools. In some developing regions, Central Europe and Russia especially, journalism schools tend to be highly theoretical places staffed by professors with little newsroom experience and almost no practical knowledge of free-enterprise journalism. Upgrading these institutions, or inventing new ones, is a key to building a level of professionalism that well-meaning but short-lived programs cannot. As Sheila Coronel of the Philippines Center for Investigative Journalism said, "We need support that's not a seminar here or there, but where you identify intellectuals in a region and you equip them with books and other materials, and some pay, and you let them teach." David Makali appeared to second this view: "I hold a dim view of short-term training programs. After you train people they disappear and results disappear. It would be better to invest in self-teaching aids, in education as part of infrastructure. I would like to see resource centers that journalists can access and that are stocked with materials for self-teaching."

Several participants did mention training programs they thought valuable, such as a World Bank project on health issues in developing nations that was coupled with an extensive reporting project. Lin Neumann described successful efforts in Thailand to first pass a national open-records law, then to train journalists how to use it. Andreas Harsono argued for specialized reporting programs that would provide journalists substantive expertise in several areas—health care, the military, religion, and finance.

Another need that might be considered under infrastructure is simple protection. Journalists who are subject to harassment, physical harm, or expulsion need both somewhere to go and a way to publicize their plight. A number of participants urged the creation of organizations or facilities that would provide physical relief and professional support to journalists in such situations.

Professional Development for Journalists: Ethics and Self-Regulation

Three participants—Andreas Harsono, Charles Onyango-Obbo, and Rosa María Alfaro—offered short expositions on the problems affecting journalistic practice in Indonesia, Uganda, and Peru, respectively. In each case the problems were different but the result the same—a lack of professionalism and widespread public distrust of the news media.

Harsono described an explosion of news and information outlets in Indonesia since the collapse of the Suharto regime, but rued the fact that thousands of people are now working as journalists who have no training and worse, no sense of reporting standards or ethics. Many are simply advocates for a particular political or religious point of view, and a huge number—approximately 80 percent, Harsono said, routinely take bribes for stories, a practice euphemistically known as "envelope journalism." Obbo, editor of Uganda's largest independent newspaper, *The Monitor*, described a situation in Uganda (which also occur in other parts of Africa) where leading news outlets are owned by the ruling elite and where journalists sometimes seek to become celebrities through arrest or detention rather than through the quality of their reporting. In Peru, Alfaro said, the state intelligence apparatus keeps a watchful eye on journalists and is not shy about using physical intimidation or torture to silence critics. Many reporters and news organizations thus find life easier and more profitable if they curry favor with the political establishment. Not surprisingly, 60 percent of Peru's people do not believe what they read or hear in the news.

At one level, of course, the need is for basic training in journalism ethics. As Alexej Simonov put it, "In countries in transition, journalists themselves don't always know good from bad practice." The caution for international organizations investing in media development is that Simonov's distinction may not be so easy to draw. In much of Central Europe and Russia, for instance, commentary, not even-handed report-

ing, is the prevailing form of news. In the aftermath of communism, the first impulse of those with newfound freedoms has been to express points of view long suppressed, not always to report public events dispassionately. Commentary as news is also a legacy of the communist period, during which journalists wishing to show their independence from the ruling party would frequently pepper their reports with sardonic remarks. It is not so clear that this legacy suits democratization or the development of a new, liberal media system.

The short experience of NTV, until recently the lone private television network in Russia, makes the point. NTV had at various times been fiercely covetous of its independence from government censorship, as in its coverage of the 1994 war in Chechnya, and at other times shamelessly allied with the government, as in its support of Boris Yeltsin's 1996 presidential campaign.⁹ Understandable as NTV's actions may have been from a political perspective, they nonetheless undermined its claim to the liberal tradition of journalistic practice and opened the network to charges that its editorial choices are politically motivated. In debt to economically powerful interests, NTV found itself harassed both by creditors and by government officials in 2000. Vladimir Gusinsky, whose MOST consortium controlled NTV until recently, was forced in late summer of 2000 to sell his stake in the company to Gazprom, a state-owned utility company. Moreover, at the time of publication of this report, Gusinsky is under House arrest in Spain and fighting extradition to Russia where he faces criminal fraud charges, thus raising the question of whether vigorous, independent media can survive under the Putin government.

Conference discussion of journalism ethics moved naturally to the question of press self-regulation and public accountability, subjects that the participants saw in practical terms. Most of the participants thought that developing accountability in the practice of journalism is key to building civil society—a case of leading by example. A second justification for self-regulation was that it provides a bulwark against arbitrary or repressive state intervention.

Self-regulation, of course, takes many forms. Internally it can include ombudsmen; Op-Ed and letters pages in newspapers; "rights of reply," including statutory ones; and various forms of research or community outreach that allow news organizations to monitor public attitudes about all manner of things, including the performance of the press. All

of these mechanisms were at least mentioned at the conference, though few were discussed at any length. Andreas Harsono, for example, spoke favorably of a right-of-reply in which people claiming to be harmed by news reports would be able to respond in a place or manner (depending on the medium) as prominent as the one in which the damage was done. Rosa Maria Alfaro, who had talked earlier about using quantitative studies of public attitudes toward journalists, spoke favorably about an experiment in civic journalism in which she had participated.

A more vigorous discussion followed on the subject of external forms of self-regulation—for example professional journalism associations and press councils. Several participants who favored these mechanisms argued as David Makali did, that professional associations can "assure ethics and monitor practice, and so help to avoid government interventions." Some participants noted that journalism associations of one kind or another (unions, for instance) were already in existence in their countries but that they did little to make journalism better and in some cases were an obstacle to improvement. Convincing journalists that their existing standards are low and their monitoring mechanisms toothless (or worse) may be a hard sell, said Kwame Karikari, but it has to be done: "Nobody will achieve anything if journalists themselves are not convinced of the need. We need reform both at the level of professional associations and at the level of each media organization, where there needs to be in-house codes and ethics training."

Interestingly, the sticking point in this discussion turned on the question of who qualifies as a journalist and how external-monitoring associations should be organized. Lin Neumann of the Southeast Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA) summarized the problem: "Strong national associations of journalists linked into regional networks are important and provide the framework to support [self-regulation]. But the key word here is 'independent.' Many regional journalism bodies have been dominated by journalists from countries that don't have a free press. You must recognize that membership for what it is and keep independent media separate from state-owned media. SEAPA was created to focus attention on countries in Southeast Asia that have a free press, because our experience was that there was no regional voice that united independent press advocacy organizations into one network."

A number of journalists at the conference observed, as Joseph Gitari, program officer for Eastern and Southern Africa for the Ford Foundation did, that the problem of organizing journalists in societies where many work for state-owned media is "very divisive." Some journalists expressed doubt that they could even make the distinction between independent journalists and others. For example, said David Makali, "It is not at all uncommon for journalists to identify with the ownership of the media houses" for which they work. Are such people independent? Further, many civil society organizations (women's groups, AIDS prevention groups, etc.) are themselves in the media business, publishing materials on a variety of important topics. Are these people journalists? All agreed that defining independence merely in terms of one's employment is insufficient; more important is independence in service to the public interest, though the principle offers little guidance on how to organize journalists professionally. Perhaps, as Kabral Blay-Amihere said, "It is better to carry everybody along, to use one umbrella to advance issues of press freedom."

Price and Neumann also asked whether the whole attempt to organize journalists, along any sort of criteria, did not raise the possibility of state "licensing" of journalists. Surprisingly, this issue received little discussion from the conferees, in part, it seemed, because of the view many expressed that self-regulation would preclude government regulation. Models exist that would support such a view, particularly in Europe, where twenty-five nations have both a press council and a professional code of journalism ethics, and nine other nations have at least a code of ethics.¹⁰ (Regarding broadcasting, many press councils are official state bodies, but they are excluded from this count.) Press councils have two main jobs: to protect the rights of the public by giving it an opportunity to complain about bad journalism and to investigate these complaints; and to protect the news media themselves from government regulation and from meddling by powerful private interests. Most press councils have both journalists and media owners as members; a few include academics as members.

At the other extreme on this subject is the American view. American journalists typically resist any but the most vague codes of conduct for fear that someone—whether the government, a public official, or an angry subject of a news story—will attempt to use the code against them in a lawsuit. Indeed, there have been a couple of

notable instances (including one that landed in the United States Supreme Court) in which judges have turned what journalists thought were voluntary ethics guidelines into mandatory court orders. For this reason and others, United States news organizations, led prominently by the *New York Times*, killed through neglect a short-lived National Press Council.

Despite all this, American journalists (and Western journalists in general) are organized into every imaginable kind of association—by medium, by position in the newsroom or in management, by reportorial specialty, by region and state, and so on. Many of these organizations do concern themselves with best practices, and some explicitly with ethics. Some are organized specifically to militate against government intervention, and many will provide financial and legal support to redress actions they perceive to be limitations on or violations of press freedom. Many notable observers of international media agree with the views expressed at the Aspen Institute conference that journalism associations, because they foster collaboration, are useful in presenting a united front against government restrictions.

Finally, a key point raised by several of the conferees is that journalism associations must be, wherever possible, inclusive of ethnic and racial minorities. Given the nature of conflict present in many of the nations represented at the conference, the recommendation is an important one for civil society and the press. Ibrahim Nawar agreed: "Newsrooms must be multicultural, with a good reflection of ethnicity, culture, and gender. This is an issue of credibility."

Conclusion: Collaborations and Change

Under the rubric of civil society, the conferees at the Aspen Institute's first international roundtable on journalism brought their focus to bear on questions of freedom from state intervention, and the development of journalistic professionalism and communications infrastructure. Given the composition of the conference group—journalists and foundation program officers—attention naturally fell on the role that journalists and international organizations could or should play in thinking creatively about the challenges in these areas. Future Aspen Institute international roundtables on journalism will presumably wish to look more closely at strategic opportunities for media development. In

anticipation of those meetings, a number of issues need more systematic and, where possible, quantitative examination.

The first issue that needs more examination concerns journalism and media aid, which predictably has mirrored the pattern of Western aid generally. That pattern can be described as "aid to end aid," in the words of the Marshall Plan, and at its worst has had a quick-fix mentality that avoids the kinds of careful need-specific planning and patience that are really required. This is partly the result, as the conferees noted, of concentrating too much aid on just a few countries, a tendency that fuels frustrations on the side of the aid giver and receiver. Developing nations, owing to unreceptive governments, weak economies, and inadequate infrastructure, cannot, as one commentator has written, be stuffed with development "the way you stuff corn into a goose."¹¹ Finally, some regions, such as Africa, get very little media aid compared to nations in Central Europe. Drawing attention to this imbalance and working to rectify it is a task for journalists and for international organizations.

A second issue that needs further examination concerns the role that journalists could or should play in educating the international aid community about journalism. As the Ford Foundation's John Phillip Santos and Larry Cox pointed out during the conference, the international aid community is relatively new to and inexperienced with media aid. So, journalists need to develop a much more sophisticated understanding of IGOs and NGOs, what they do and, more importantly perhaps, what their limitations are. NGOs, for instance, now deliver more assistance each year than the United Nations does (*not* counting the assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). But aid overall has declined around the world in the 1990s, and some of the infrastructure problems identified at the Aspen Institute conference—poverty, for instance—cannot be fixed by the trickle of aid that goes to them. It seems unlikely that international organizations can provide, on a sustained basis, such essential public functions as education, health care, or housing. In so far as these things create the enabling conditions for civil society and press freedom, civil society and press freedom may remain precarious things in many parts of the world. Even where living conditions improve, civil society is not the same as, nor is it a substitute for, democratically accountable governance. IGOs and NGOs cannot provide such governance and, as their critics often point out, they are themselves unaccountable.

One key lesson from the conference, then, is that for media assistance to be effective journalists themselves need to take a leadership role in conceiving it and carrying it out. Further, journalists should urge international organizations to coordinate their efforts more effectively. One possible approach is to utilize the World Wide Web site IJN.org, operated by the International Center for Journalists; the site posts information on the lessons learned from media development programs, reports who is doing what, and lists knowledgeable contacts in the field. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) may be more likely to cooperate than nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will, but based on the comments made at the conference, NGOs could and should do better. Funders could give a boost to such coordination and collaboration by insisting on it as a requirement for funding.

Above all, journalists need to think more strategically about the ends that aid should serve—about what kind of journalism is desirable for what kind of society. One way to do that, at conference tables and elsewhere, is to broaden the base of knowledge about international journalism, to include scholars, policy makers, and others whose experience and ideas can more fully inform the effort to build a civil society and advance the process of democratization.

Notes

1. Monroe E. Price, ed., *Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives, the Experience of Intergovernmental and Non-Governmental Organizations* University of Oxford: Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, May 2000.
2. For more on this subject, see *1999 World Press Freedom Review*. Vienna, Austria: International Press Institute, December 1999.
3. James Carey, "A Republic if You Can Keep It: Liberty and Public Life in the Age of Glasnost," in *Crucible of Liberty: 200 Years of the Bill of Rights*, ed. Raymond Arsenault (New York: Free Press, 1991), 108.
4. Don E. Eberly, "The Meaning, Origins, and Applications of Civil Society," in *The Essential Civil Society Reader: The Classic Essays*, ed. Don E. Eberly. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.
5. Margaret Blanchard, "Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts Prior to Gitlow," in *The First Amendment Reconsidered: New Perspectives on the Meaning of Freedom of Speech and Press*, eds. Bill F. Chamberlin and Charlene J. Brown. New York: Longman, 1982.
6. Brian C. Murchinson et al., "Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism," *North Carolina Law Review*, 73:1, 1994.
7. Guy Berger, "Grave New World? Democratic Journalism Enters the Global Twenty-First Century," *Journalism Studies*, 1:1, 2000.
8. Berger, "Grave New World?"
9. Ellen Mickiewicz, *Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999.
10. Kaarle Nordenstreng, "European Landscape of Media Self-Regulation," in *Freedom and Responsibility Yearbook, 1998/99*. Vienna: OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 1999.
11. John Maxwell Hamilton, "Lessons for the Media from Foreign Aid," *Media Studies Journal*, 13:3, Fall 1999. Hamilton's essay provides an excellent overview of media aid since the close of the Cold War.

APPENDIX



The Aspen Institute
International Roundtable on Journalism

*Principles and Practice of a Free and Responsible Press:
Lessons from Societies in Conflict and Transition*

May 30 - June 1, 2000
Queenstown, Maryland

List of Conference Participants

Rosa María Alfaro Moreno
Asociación de Comunicadores
Sociales (CALANDRIA)
PERU

Kabral Blay-Amihere
President
West African Journalists
Association
Ghana International Press Centre
GHANA

Sheila Coronel
Executive Director
Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism
PHILIPPINES

Larry Cox
Program Officer
Human Rights and International
Cooperation
The Ford Foundation
UNITED STATES

Basma El-Husseiny
Program Officer
Media, Arts and Culture
The Ford Foundation
EGYPT

Charles M. Firestone
Executive Director
Communications and Society
Program
The Aspen Institute
UNITED STATES

Jon Funabiki
Program Officer
Media, Arts and Culture
The Ford Foundation
UNITED STATES

Amy Korzick Garmer
Director of Journalism Projects
and
Associate Director
Communications and Society
Program
The Aspen Institute
UNITED STATES

Joseph Gitari
Program Officer
Eastern and Southern Africa
The Ford Foundation
KENYA

Note: Titles and affiliations are as of date of conference.

Andreas Harsono

Institute for the Studies on Free
Flow of Information (ISAI)
INDONESIA

Kwame Karikari

Executive Director
Media Foundation for West
Africa
GHANA

Craig LaMay

Associate Dean
Medill School of Journalism
Northwestern University
UNITED STATES

Gordana Logar

Member of the Editorial Board
DANAS
YUGOSLAVIA

David Makali

Editor
Expression Today
and
Director
The Media Institute
KENYA

Ibrahim Nawar

Chairman
Arab Press Freedom Watch
and
Economic Editor
and
Head of Business News
Al Jazeera
UNITED KINGDOM

A. Lin Neumann

Advisor
Southeast Asia Press Alliance
THAILAND

Charles Onyango-Obbo

Editor
The Monitor
UGANDA

Aida Opoku-Mensah

Program Officer
Media, Arts and Culture
The Ford Foundation
NIGERIA

Sharmini Peries

Executive Director
International Freedom of
Expression Exchange
Canadian Journalists for Free
Expression
CANADA

Monroe E. Price

Joseph and Sadie Danciger
Professor of Law
and
Director
Howard M. Squadron Program in
Media, Law, and Society
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law
UNITED STATES

E. Raghavan

Editor (South)
The Economic Times
INDIA

John Phillip Santos

Program Officer

Media, Arts and Culture

The Ford Foundation

UNITED STATES

Alexej Simonov

President

Glasnost Defense Foundation

RUSSIA

Maciej Wierzynski

Director

Voice of America, Polish Service

POLAND

Staff:

Sunny Sumter-Sana

Senior Program Coordinator

Communications and Society

Program

The Aspen Institute

UNITED STATES

Note: Titles and affiliations are as of date of conference.

About the Author

Craig L. LaMay, a journalist and communications researcher, is currently associate dean and assistant professor at Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism. He is also an adjunct professor at Northwestern University Law School; a faculty member of Media Management Center (MMC), a media management program of Medill and the Kellogg Graduate School of Management; and a faculty associate at Northwestern University's Institute for Policy Research. LaMay began his career as a newspaper reporter and is the former editor of the Freedom Forum's Media Studies Journal. He is author or co-author of several books including, *To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector*, *Democracy on the Air*, and *Television Autonomy and the State*. He researches and teaches First Amendment law and history, telecommunications regulation, and journalism and democratization.

The Aspen Institute Communications and Society Program

The Communications and Society Program is a global forum for leveraging the knowledge and power of leaders and experts to improve the human condition.

The overall goal of the Program is to promote innovative, knowledge and values-based decision-making in the fields of communications, information, and new media. As a neutral and nonpartisan convenor, the Communications and Society Program is uniquely situated to accomplish this goal. It does so through a variety of activities aimed at promoting constructive inquiry and dialogue, and the development and dissemination of new models and options for informed and wise policy decisions.

In particular, the Program provides an active venue for global leaders and experts from a variety of disciplines to exchange and gain new knowledge and insights on the societal impact of advances in digital technology and communications. The Program also creates a multi-disciplinary space in the communications policy-making world where veteran and emerging decision-makers can explore new concepts, find personal growth and insight, and develop new networks for the betterment of the policy-making process and society.

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Conference reports and other materials are distributed to key policy-makers and opinion leaders, within the United States and around the world, and to the public at large through the World Wide Web.