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**Two Steps Forward:
The Path to a Successful 2010 NPT Review Conference**

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In recent years, nuclear threats have increased, progress towards disarmament and nonproliferation has slowed, and faith in the collective bargain of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has eroded. The NPT remains the backbone of the non-proliferation regime, but, without renewed leadership and support, the regime will weaken further, with at least some possibility of collapse.

The United States is in a position to exert such leadership. The new administration is moving forward with an array of policy initiatives that enjoy the support of U.S. allies, and yielded constructive negotiations with Russia.

The May 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference may be a pivotal moment in this process. A successful conference could restore confidence in the regime, increase the barriers to proliferation, encourage further reductions in nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk that programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy will be used for weapons purposes.

This paper suggests that a successful review conference would be one that achieves agreement of the state parties to a new action plan that strengthens the treaty in all its aspects. The elements of such a plan are included at the end of this paper.

There are two recent models for success—the 1995 and the 2000 review conferences. The first achieved the indefinite extension of the NPT and the strengthening of the treaty with a new review process and adoption of new international principles for non-proliferation. The second achieved consensus on a final document with Thirteen Practical Steps “for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament.” These steps have since become the consensus foundation for non-proliferation policy and multilateral nuclear disarmament.

While successful in some respects, the Review Conference has also fallen short in important ways. The 2005 conference ended acrimoniously, failing to act on the consensus of the majority of states for stronger nonproliferation and disarmament efforts or to adopt

any of the dozens of useful suggestions proposed by many of the nations present. As other nations concluded that the United States had no intention of fulfilling its NPT disarmament obligations, they balked at shouldering additional counter-proliferation burdens. The failure of the 2005 Review Conference contributed to serious questions about the health of the non-proliferation regime.

This is not an abstract problem. The recent trend of lax compliance with or withdrawal threats from the NPT poses a serious proliferation risk. The High-Level Expert Panel to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (which included Brent Scowcroft) warned in 2004 that, “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

The panel further noted the connection between disarmament and proliferation noted above, “Lackluster disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States weakens the diplomatic force of the non-proliferation regime and thus its ability to constrain proliferation.”

The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, co-chaired by William Perry and James Schlesinger, recognized, “Collapse [of the non-proliferation regime] would significantly impair the ability of the United States to pursue the agenda reflected in this report for reducing nuclear dangers and would likely create new nuclear dangers to the United States and its allies and friends.”

U.S. Nuclear Policy and Prospects for Success

There are two general views on what is required of the United States for a successful conference in 2010.

The first holds that it is sufficient for the U.S. to enter the conference with a new START agreement, a plan for negotiations for a new treaty with Russia for deeper reductions, and a process underway for the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These steps, coupled with speeches by senior officials, most importantly the President, will convince other nations the U.S. is meeting its disarmament obligations.

The second view is that speeches and stockpiles reductions are necessary but not sufficient conditions for success. More will be needed to win the support of non-nuclear-weapon states, particularly CTBT ratification.

This later view is supported by the experience of past review conferences. When nuclear-weapon states reported on the pace of their reductions, other delegates counter that reduction is not elimination.

“While we welcome the efforts made by nuclear weapon-states for the reduction of stockpiles, the progress achieved thus far does not necessarily represent a commitment to

disarmament,” said Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, the head of the Brazilian delegation to the 2008 Preparatory Committee meeting.

Despite the favorable reaction of most states to the election of President Barack Obama, there remains widespread cynicism about the intentions of the nuclear-weapon states. U.S. ratification of the CTBT and action towards entry into force with ratification by the remaining holdout nations could assuage many of these doubts. This has been seen as—and remains—the surest path to success. However, it now appears difficult, though not impossible, to secure U.S. ratification by May 2010.

What, then, could be a plan to maximize chances of a successful conference short of test ban ratification?

Presidential and senior official statements do matter. As Rebecca Johnson, editor of *Disarmament Diplomacy* and veteran observer of the NPT review process, notes:

The third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Review Conference for the NPT was heralded as a much-needed success story. This was largely credited to the Obama administration's more positive approach to multilateral diplomacy and arms control, though the Chair of the meeting, Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe was widely commended for his careful preparations and effective leadership style.

This author attended the sessions and can affirm the near-euphoric mood that greeted the speech by Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller at the conference in May.

The speeches by President Obama in Prague, Moscow and at the United Nations in September will help, as will the U.S.-drafted UN Security Council resolution (appended) on a strong, balanced nonproliferation and disarmament agenda and the participation of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the September Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT.

Progress will require more than mood setting, however. A comprehensive sequence of initiatives could include:

- A Nuclear Posture Review that offers options that would sharply reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy
- A clear commitment not to develop new nuclear weapons (and budgets reflecting that commitment)
- Ratification of the New START treaty by March 2010
- Commitment to negotiate with Russia a new treaty for substantial reductions, perhaps to a limit of no more than 1,000 warheads each
- A successful April 2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit

- A concerted effort to move the Senate to the final stages of ratification of the CTBT
- High-level U.S. representation at the NPT Review Conference (Vice-President Al Gore spoke in 1995)
- Coordinated support from the other NPT nuclear-weapon states
- President Obama's continued demonstration that he remains committed to "the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."

This approach of "reductions plus" could demonstrate verifiable progress on U.S. disarmament commitments and provide the basis for the success of the review conference agenda.

A Shift in Direction

Achieving such an approach will require the administration to shift current strategy. At present, the confluence of several policy processes is setting up a nuclear policy train wreck in early 2010, including:

- A 2010 Nuclear Posture Review released this winter that early reports indicate will focus on preserving the role of nuclear weapons and their deployment systems.
- A new START agreement that some will see as not reducing U.S. or Russian weapons below what each side has already planned and that will stretch out over a seven-year implementation period.
- A START ratification process that will begin in mid-winter and likely run into mid-spring, limiting the time available for Senate action on CTBT.
- Conservative opponents to START determined to condition ratification on budgetary support for "modernization" of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and labs, thereby forcing the administration in a direction that runs counter to its nuclear policy objectives and treaty commitments.
- The efforts of some members of the administration to promote modernization policies that unnecessarily replace entire nuclear weapons systems and subsystems.

If current trends continue, the NPT conference could end up in the wreckage. Instead of focusing on the policy of nuclear restraint embodied in the CTBT and the new START agreement during the run-up to the NPT Review, Congress and the administration could be headed for a very public, divisive, and—on the global stage—unhelpful debate, not over *whether* but rather *how much* should be invested in future modernization of U.S. nuclear forces and the supporting nuclear weapons complex.

Thus, the administration will take two steps forward with START and CTBT, but one huge, damaging step backward with weapons modernization. The nonproliferation benefits of the U.S. arms control policies will be undercut by the costs of its nuclear weapon modernization policies. U.S. negotiators at the conference may be greeted by now familiar cynicism. Diplomacy and strong-arm tactics—often successful in bringing states into line

for U.S. resolutions—will work to some extent, but can never achieve the true commitment and consensus needed to enforce universal compliance with non-proliferation norms.

To avoid this scenario the administration could—and should—do the following:

- Restore White House control of the Nuclear Posture Review process to balance the requirements of maintaining a safe and secure nuclear stockpile with requirements for reducing nuclear threats.
- Segment strategic investments: Provide funding for those elements related to START ratification and to ensure the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship program and the nuclear weapons complex for the near-term, but defer long-term funding commitments for major nuclear weapons infrastructure investments until the 2012 funding cycle, or until after treaty ratifications, posture recommendations and NPT deliberations can clarify the strategic landscape.
- Clarify and reiterate the President’s pledge to “stop the development of new nuclear weapons.”
- Coordinate with key Congressional supporters in both parties how to defuse the opponents’ strategy of attaching conditions to START ratification that would handcuff the President’s nuclear policy discretion.
- Begin dedicated work now on the test ban ratification process, sequencing its consideration with START approval.
- Consult with key nations and coordinate with allies on strategies and agendas for the NPT conference.

This coordinated approach could develop the foundation that would allow US negotiators to steer the conference to a productive consensus.

At the Conference

None of this will happen automatically. Getting it right requires diligent work at the conference itself and months before. The U.S. appears in good shape with a solid team at the State Department led by Ambassador Susan Burk and enjoying the expertise of senior advisor Robert Einhorn, both already involved in extensive consultations. There appears to be high-level attention to the issue (something lacking the year before the 1995 conference and absent altogether in 2005) including by Secretary Clinton and Undersecretary Ellen Tauscher. The interagency process involving the NSC and the Vice-President’s office appears in good shape.

The president-designate of the conference, Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan of the Philippines, is given high marks by his colleagues and has already conducted one round of consultations in New York. He plans two more from September to December this year and a fourth from January to April 2010.

These consultations by the chair and the U.S. aim to forge initial agreement on procedural issues and the key substantive issues to be discussed at the conference. The PrepCom made significant progress in both regards, reaching early agreement on an agenda, draft rules of procedure, and background documentation and coming close to agreement on substantive recommendations.

The conference, to be held May 3-28 in New York, will first formally adopt final procedures and vice-chairs for the various committees (disarmament and negative assurance, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of energy), then review what has been done to date to implement the NPT, then turn to a program of action to carry the treaty forward.

Key Issues

Discussion will likely center on: disarmament performance, ratification of the CTBT, establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, a possible reporting mechanism for nuclear weapon reductions, establishment of a fuel bank, inclusion of India, Pakistan and Israel in the treaty, a new mechanism for enforcing compliance and new penalties for withdrawal from the treaty.

While a Middle East nuclear-free zone is not high on the U.S. agenda, it is for other states, notably Egypt. The U.S. would be well served to have made some progress in this area before the conference, at least on the Israel-Palestinian peace process.

Similarly, access to nuclear technologies for peaceful issues (Article IV) is championed by Iran. Other nations support Iran on this, in part as a way of “getting back” at the nuclear-weapon states. This has been quite disruptive in previous meetings. If states are satisfied on disarmament progress, however, they will be less inclined to rally behind efforts by Iran, Egypt or other states to block progress at the conference.

Desired Outcomes

In the ASG’s 2004 report, *The Challenges of Proliferation*, Kurt Campbell closes with recommendations to shore up the NPT [numbered and italicized for reference below]:

A variety of mechanisms should be considered to close the existing loopholes in the NPT. [1] *For instance, the U.S. and its allies should work to promote consensus regarding the notion that the spread of closed fuel cycles is dangerous and that this continuing loophole endangers the overall viability of the non-nuclear bargain.* [2] *In addition, the U.S. needs to work with its allies to ensure that a more rigorous inspections regime—specifically, the Additional Protocol—becomes a mandatory part of a strengthened NPT.* In addition, the U.S. needs to make clear to other states that the NPT is a bargain among have-nots as well as a bargain between haves and have-nots. Those states that have decided to forgo the development of a nuclear weapons capability have a vested interest in ensuring that other states that have committed to do so are not violating

the terms of the agreement. [3] *In addition, those states that are recognized as possessing nuclear weapons under the NPT also have to reassure the other signatories to the treaty that they take the commitment embodied in Article VI of the treaty more seriously.* [4] *Finally, the U.S. should work to develop an international consensus around measures that would make withdrawal from the NPT more difficult and costly—for example, [5] a Security Council resolution requiring a state withdrawing from the Treaty give up any nuclear facilities acquired while it was a party, or a resolution calling for Council deliberations in the event that any NPT party gives ninety-day notice of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty.*

The draft resolution for the UN Security Council includes most of these points and more, specifically:

- [1] Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible.
- [2] Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system.
- [3] Calls upon the Parties to the NPT to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament.
- [4] Undertakes to address without delay any State's notice of withdrawal from the NPT...[and]identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirms that a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal.
- [5] Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal.

An action plan built around these and other elements of the draft resolution could be a forward-looking action plan addressing all three “pillars” of the NPT and one that could win consensus of the 190 state parties to the treaty.

APPENDIX

Draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament.

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

Reaffirming that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations and relevant international organizations in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, as well as the Conference on Disarmament, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,

Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

Recalling the Statement by its President adopted at the Council's meeting held on 19 November 2008 (S/PRST/2008/43),

Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programmes or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and *underlining* the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

Welcoming and *supporting* the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and *reaffirming* the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

Noting its support, in this context, for the convening of the Second Conference of States Parties and signatories of the Treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones to be held in New York on 30 April 2010,

Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009),

Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008),

Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, and *recognizing* the need for all States to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists,

Noting with interest the initiative to convene, in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Expressing its support for the convening of the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

Affirming its support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

Noting the contribution of civil society in promoting all the objectives of the NPT,

Reaffirming its resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and *calling upon* all Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

1. *Emphasizes* that a situation of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and *emphasizes* the Security Council's primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2. *Calls upon* States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty;

3. *Notes* that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

4. *Calls upon* all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms;

5. *Calls upon* the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and *calls on* all other States to join in this endeavour;

6. *Calls upon* all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty's three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament;

7. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date;

8. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, *welcomes* the Conference on Disarmament's adoption by consensus of its Programme of Work in 2009, and *requests* all Member States to cooperate in guiding the Conference to an early commencement of substantive work;

9. *Recalls* the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and *affirms* that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

10. *Expresses* particular concern at the current major challenges to the non-proliferation regime that the Security Council has acted upon, *demand*s that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, and *reaffirms* its call upon them to find an early negotiated solution to these issues;

11. *Encourages* efforts to ensure development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries seeking to maintain or develop their capacities in this field in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

12. *Underlines* that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II, and *recalls* in this context Article III of the NPT and Article II of the IAEA Statute;

13. *Calls upon* States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

14. *Encourages* the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and *urges* the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

15. *Affirms* that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

(a) *Calls upon* all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

(b) *Calls upon* all States to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

(c) *Stresses* the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of

nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

16. *Encourages* States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and *affirms* the Security Council's resolve to support the IAEA's efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

17. *Undertakes* to address without delay any State's notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while noting ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and *affirms* that a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

18. *Encourages* States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, non-compliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

19. *Encourages* States to consider whether a recipient State has signed and ratified an additional protocol based on the model additional protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

20. *Urges* States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

21. *Calls for* universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;

22. *Welcomes* the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and *affirms* its commitment to promote full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

23. *Reaffirms* the need for full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for,

weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, *calls upon* Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) provisions, and in this context *welcomes* the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and *calls upon* all States to participate actively in this review;

24. *Calls upon* Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

25. *Calls upon* all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

26. *Calls upon* all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and *calls upon* those States in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard;

27. *Urges* all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

28. *Declares* its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

29. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.