

## Endnotes

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## 1 Gap between US and European perception of risks from China persists (2021, percent saying China poses a risk)

Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by Kekst CNC. In response to the question “Here are some specific risks. How great a risk do the following things pose to the world [on a 0-10 scale, where 0 is a ‘very low’ and 10 is a ‘very high’ risk]?” The figure indicates the percent share of those who think the risk is greater than 6 out of 10.

## 2 Europeans expect China, not the US, to lead the world in technology 50 years from now (2021, percent)

Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In response to the question: “In 50 years, which power do you think will be the greatest power in the following areas? – Military, economic, technology.”

## 3 Economic relations with the United States still matter most for the EU (EU trade with China and the United States in selected sectors, EUR billions)

Illustration by the Mercator Institute for China Studies based on data from “Database,” n.a.: Eurostat, 2021, <https://perma.cc/7DDL-JGVH>.

## 4 The US dominates the global chip market (market shares by country/region, 2018)

Illustration by the Mercator Institute for China Studies based on data from “2020 State of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,” Washington, DC: Semiconductor Industry Association, June 2020, <https://perma.cc/8V6D-2UKA>; “Market Statistics,” Morgan Hill, CA: World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, 2021, <https://perma.cc/4UZA-EL7L>; HIS Global Consult; PricewaterhouseCoopers.

## 5 North Americans say their countries should oppose China both militarily and economically – unlike Europeans (2021, percent)

Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “What do you think your country should do in response to the rise of China as a military and economic power?” Respondents were given the following options: “fully cooperate with China,” “somewhat cooperate with China,” “stay neutral,” “somewhat oppose China,” “fully oppose China,” “don’t know.” Figures shown are the net of the total percentage for “oppose” minus the total percentage for “cooperate.”

**6 China's defense budget continues to increase as geopolitical tensions rise (China's official defense and foreign affairs expenditures in CNY billions, 2010–2021)**

Illustration by the Mercator Institute for China Studies based on data from “Cáizhèng Shùjù (Financial Data),” Beijing: Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China, 2021, <https://perma.cc/A7UG-D5V5>.

**7 China increases military pressure on Taiwan (large-scale PLA maneuvers and drills around Taiwan, 2015–2020)**

Data and illustration by the Mercator Institute for China Studies, based on systematized and continuous tracking of open source intelligence. Note that, in addition to large-scale PLA maneuvers and drills, incursions by the PLA Air Force into the Taiwanese Air Defense Identification Zone have also increased. See: Gerald C. Brown, “Taiwan ADIZ Violations,” July 2021, <https://perma.cc/WBM3-2VYW>.